The Basel II Framework - The Practical Application in Two Swedish Banks by Ulfgrim, Erica & Johansson, Karin
Department of Business Administration
The Basel II Framework
- The Practical Application in Two Swedish Banks
Authors: Advisor:
Karin Johansson Gunnar Wahlström
Erica Ulfgrim
1Abstract
Title: The Basel II Framework – The Practical Application in Two 
Swedish Banks
Seminar date: 5th June 2009
Course: BUSP03 Degree Project in Accounting and Auditing, FEKP01 
Examensarbete Magisternivå
Authors: Karin Johansson and Erica Ulfgrim
Advisor: Ek. Dr. Gunnar Wahlström
Five key words: Basel II, calculative cultures, compliance, practical application,
risk management
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to study the practical application of 
the Basel II Framework in two Swedish banks of different 
organisational structure and briefly investigate the opinions of the 
framework now that it has been in use for some time. 
Methodology: Qualitative approach, inductive study, grounded theory, 
phenomenology, telephone and face-to-face interviews
Theoretical perspectives: The theoretical perspectives begin with the concept of risk 
metaphors and criticism towards a number of earlier risk measures 
is presented. This leads down to the issue of why risk 
measurements do not work. Thereafter earlier studies on why there 
is a reliance on numbers and why people come to believe in 
statements are taken up. Furthermore there is a presentation of why 
Basel II is argued to promote centralised management. Finally we 
present a study on enterprise risk management which has shown 
that variations exist in practical application. 
Empirical foundation: The empirical foundation consists of data from a number of 
interviews with respondents working at two Swedish banks of 
different organisational structure. One bank is decentralised and 
one is centralised. Furthermore one interview was conducted with 
the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. 
Conclusion: Regarding the practical application of Basel II we have found that 
the decentralised Bank A has gone from a more holistic approach 
to risk management to show more numeric tendencies. The 
centralised Bank B probably had numeric tendencies already 
before the transfer to Basel II and this has remained so. We have 
also seen that the banks achieve compliance and uniformity in 
similar ways but emphasise different things. Bank A emphasised 
an understanding of the framework while Bank B put more 
emphasis on the use of calculations. Finally we found that the 
general opinions about Basel II now that it has been implemented 
for some time were positive. 
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5A Note to the Reader
Before you begin reading this thesis we would like to clarify that when we throughout this 
thesis refer to either; Basel II, the Basel II Framework, the framework and the new 
framework, we are at all times referring to the Basel II Framework issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision that was available for implementation at the year-end 
2007. 
61. Introduction
This chapter will describe the context of this thesis, starting with a background illustrating 
the financial crisis and the problems with risk measures. This is followed by an introductory 
discussion and an account of earlier research leading down to our focus questions and the 
intent of this study.
1.1 Background
The world is currently enduring the worst financial crisis since the crash on Wall Street in 
1929. From the starting point in the United States in July 2007, the crisis has now spread to 
large parts of the world, having effects on for example mortgages, pensions and financing, 
causing great increases in unemployment. Initiatives in the form of liquidity injections, 
guarantees for financial activities and various packages for economic stimulation, taken by 
governments and central banks have so far only had limited success.1
The causes to the financial crisis have been widely discussed in media worldwide. The core of 
the current crises is to be found in the abundance of liquidity and low interest rates that have 
been offered to lenders. The effects of this were amplified by financial innovation, and the 
idea that the high growth levels of the past decade were likely to remain permanently.2
The abundance of liquidity and low returns made investors seek higher yields and the result 
was the mis-pricing of risk. With time came financial instruments that were designed to 
increase yields, in combination with increased leverage.3
The high degree of competition and low interest rates, made the participants of financial 
markets look for possibilities of even higher yields which was achieved through increased 
leverage or investing in assets with a higher degree of risks. Participants of the financial 
markets were taking greater risks, but the risks were mis-priced and with increased leverage 
financial institutions became more vulnerable to changes in asset values.4
The ongoing financial crisis has also shed a light on the failures in assessment of risks and the 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions. The core of the issue is that prior to the 
financial crisis there was a belief that financial institutions could better manage their risks that 
what was in fact true. This in turn resulted in misjudgements of the necessary capital base.5
                                               
1 De Larosière Report (2009), p. 6
2 Ibid., p. 7
3 Ibid., pp. 7-8
4 Ibid., p. 8
5 Ibid., p. 8
7Furthermore risk was not easy to assess, partly due to complex structures of financial 
products. In addition to this models for risk assessment underestimated risk exposure and the 
lack of transparency in financial markets caused grey areas concerning the banking system.6
1.2 Introductory Discussion
Daily news is published about the ongoing financial crisis and last year the Swedish 
newspaper Dagens Nyheter published an article stating that this crisis was the worst since the 
financial crisis of the 1930s7. Nevertheless, the world has experienced a number of financial 
crises during past decades and in response to these crises there has been an enormous growth 
in financial risk modelling, resulting in market risk regulations being model based8. 
Risk has often been measured by historical probabilities9. Though, many of these risk models 
have faced harsh criticism. McGoun claims that interpretations of the portfolio model CAPM
(Capital Asset Pricing Model) are flawed, and believes that there is no rational reason for its 
success. He further states that CAPM’s normative value has not, and cannot, be 
demonstrated.10 His approach confirms a statement by Roll in 1977, who claimed that CAPM 
is no science, since the theory is not testable11. 
Daníelsson broadens the discussion when reflecting over limits in risk modelling. He states 
that;
“Most existing risk models break down in times of crisis because the 
stochastic process of market prices is endogenous to the actions of market 
participants.”12
Further he argues that in times of crisis people’s actions become more homogenous and there 
is a general shift towards safer assets13. Furthermore, Daníelsson claims that if risk modelling 
is not done with great skill and care, the risk forecast will be unreliable to the point of being 
useless14. 
However, in 2007 a new framework for risk management was introduced called the Basel II 
Framework and it was issued by The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision15. Compared 
to previous regulations, Basel II provides a more flexible and adaptable framework that can 
evolve with the market16. The framework gives financial institutions more freedom in 
                                               
6 De Larosière Report (2009), p. 8
7 www.dn.se/ekonomi/finanskrisen-ar-over-ar-2012-1.569455
8 Danìelsson, J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling, (2002),  p. 1273
9 McGoun, E. G., The History Of Risk “Mesurement”, (1995), p. 511
10 McGoun, E. G., The CAPM: A Nobel Failue, (1992), p.170
11 Roll, R., A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory’s Test, Journal of Finance Economists, (1977), p. 130
12 Danìelsson, J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling, (2002), p. 1293
13 Ibid., p. 1275
14 Ibid., p. 1293
15 www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm
16 Ibid.
8choosing methods for calculating the necessary capital base. In light of the ongoing financial 
crisis, and considering the importance of banks having a sufficient capital base, Basel II 
becomes of interest to study. 
Earlier research regarding this framework was conducted before its implementation or has 
mainly focused on the opinions towards the framework, why its practical application has not 
yet been examined. With the harsh criticism against many other risk measures in mind, we are 
curious about the Basel II Framework and the opinions of users now that it has been in use for 
a while. 
Historically, the performance of decentralised banks has been very good and Wallander states 
that Handelsbanken, which was once radically decentralised, has had profitability higher than 
the mean of the other Swedish banks17. However, it has been argued that the Basel II 
Framework will be disadvantageous for decentralised banks, since the framework 
concentrates power to the headquarters. This implies that the framework is more in line with 
centralised management.18 This discussion made the authors question whether the framework 
was disadvantageous for decentralised banks.
Moreover, Mikes has argued that systematic variations in risk management exist in practice19. 
This made the authors curious as to whether or not there are any variations in the practical 
application of the Basel II Framework between centralised and decentralised banks. 
As can be read from the discussion above, there is a knowledge gap regarding the practical 
application of the Basel II Framework. Even though Mikes has studied the practical 
differences risk management, her study did not consider the Basel II Framework. 
Furthermore, earlier studies have focused on Basel II before it was actually in use.
1.3 Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to study the practical application of the Basel II Framework in 
two Swedish banks of different organisational structure and briefly investigate the opinions of 
the framework now that it has been in use for some time. 
                                               
17 Wallander, J., Budgeting * an unnecessary evil, (1999), p. 406 
18 Wahlström, G., Risk management versus operational action: Basel II in a Swedish context, (2009), pp. 60-61
19 Mikes, A., Risk management and calculative cultures, (2009), p. 18
91.4 Focus Questions
 How do these two Swedish banks practically apply the Basel II framework? 
 Are their any variations in their practical application? 
 How do they secure uniform application and compliance with the Basel II 
Framework? 
 And further, what are their opinions on the Basel II Framework now when it has been 
in use for some time? 
1.5 Chapter summary
Based on the discussion above it appears that risk is not easy to asses and in the current 
financial crisis the models underestimated the risk exposure, causing concerns among banks. 
A number of the risk measures have faced criticism and they have been accused of falling
apart in times of crisis. A new framework for risk managing was available for implementation 
in 2007 and this offers a more flexible approach than its predecessors. Since earlier research 
was conducted before the frameworks implementation this thesis will focus on examining the 
practical application of the framework. Further, since Mikes’ study suggested that systematic 
variations in risk management exist in practice20, the authors aim to examine if there are any 
variations in the practical application between banks of different organisational structure. This 
will be achieved by examining two banks of different organisational structure. 
                                               
20 Mikes, A., Risk management and calculative cultures, (2009), p. 18
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2. Literature 
The following chapter will give a deeper portrayal of risk and why the risk measures tend not 
to work. It will give light to the fact that there are variations among organisations regarding 
the practical application of risk measures and why people, despite the downsides, tend to rely 
on numbers when determining risk. This is followed by a section on statements and 
misstatements explaining why people tend to believe in certain information. The chapter will 
further describe the advantages of decentralised organisations in the banking industry, and 
the fact that the Basel II Framework tends to promote a centralised structure. The chapter 
will conclude with a section on criticism of the implementation of the framework.
2. 1 Risk metaphors – Is Risk All Bad?
Risk is a concept that is often viewed negatively. As argued by Young, risk is often set in 
contrast to rewards, implying that risk is something bad, a view that is amplified when risk is 
set together with terms such as the risk of loss. Young describes three metaphorical 
constructions of risk that all create an image of risk as something negative, that may be 
assessed and which can and should be controlled. These metaphors are the orientational, the
attribute and the ontological.21
Within the orientational metaphors references to the upside or downside result in negative 
views of risk. As Young describes it, risk is often contrasted to the “upside potential” causing 
people to associate risk with a downside potential.22
Attribute metaphors refer to risk as a quality or attribute of entities, assets, liabilities and 
commitments. Risk becomes a phenomenon which can be reflected upon in importance or 
size. When risk is seen as a quality of an item it also becomes a matter for consideration when 
performing accounting calculations. Furthermore Young argues that risk as a quality enables 
us to compare the relative riskiness of items and furthermore to compare similar or different 
degrees of risk in items.23
Young describes ontological risk metaphors as those where risk is seen as a thing apart or 
outside of an entity. Within the ontological metaphors risk can be seen in a number of ways, 
one of which is risk as a substance. Risk is then seen as something which may be pooled, has 
a number of levels which differ between companies and over time and may be concentrated to 
certain areas or activities. Thus risk can change and does not always remain at the same level 
and it can also be seen as a phenomenon which is sensitive to changes in market prices. 
                                               
21 Young J., Risk(ing) Metaphors (2001), p. 612
22 Ibid., pp. 612-613
23 Ibid., pp. 613-614
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Young has also used the ontological metaphors to categorise risk as a burden, it is perceived 
as a burden for someone to bear. A person can as such choose to retain risk rather than reduce 
it but can also choose to transfer it to another party. Risk can also be seen as exposure where 
companies can be at risk, or place their capital at risk. Risk thus becomes an external threat to 
financial wellbeing. Young has also described risk as a threat similar to that of a disease as 
economic entities are exposed to the possibility of negative events in the future. An increased 
exposure to risk increases the likelihood of these negative events, as does exposure to a 
disease. However, it may also be possible to create immunity to risk as is possible in the case 
of disease. The last of the classifications within the ontological risk metaphors presented by 
Young is that of risk as adversary. Risk is then seen as a phenomenon which we face and can 
protect ourselves against, as well as something that can be neutralised. This introduces an 
element of control to risk, suggesting that this is something which we must do. The 
conclusions which can be drawn from the ontological risk metaphors are that risk is external 
to us, and also a phenomenon which may be controlled.24
Young proposes that one of the reasons to the great increase in “risk management devices” 
that has been seen in recent years, could be that risk as a result of the usage of risk metaphors, 
has come to be seen as a manageable phenomenon. The use of metaphors has also caused 
people to believe that risk may be controlled or dominated. To fulfil this purpose efforts have 
been focused on finding improved methods of managing risk, to defeat, control or even 
dominate it. Risk management has grown to become a part of well-managed businesses that is 
taken for granted. However, not all metaphors contribute to the view that risk is manageable, 
theories on risk as chaos; can lead to questioning of whether or not it is possible to manage 
risk.25
2.2 Why Risk Measures do not Work
2.2.1 Portfolio Theory
Portfolio theory was developed by Harry Markowitz in 1952 and it is concerned with finding 
the most efficient portfolio for an investor, giving the highest return for the degree of risk that 
the investor will accept. The concept underlying the theory is that by spreading investments 
across a number of assets in a portfolio, an investor can reduce his or her overall risk. This is 
achieved as bad news and lowered stock prices for one company in the portfolio can be 
levelled out by good news and raised stock prices for another.26
Markowitz’s modern portfolio theory has with time been further developed into what has 
become known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM27. The first steps to the 
development towards CAPM were taken by James Tobin in 195828. Tobin sought to explain 
                                               
24 Young J., Risk(ing) Metaphors (2001), pp. 614-618
25 Ibid., pp. 618-621
26 Arnold, G., Corporate Financial Management, (2005), p. 276
27 McGoun, E. G., The CAPM: A Nobel Failure, (1992), p. 163
28 Ibid., p. 163
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investors’ demand for cash as preferred to interest-bearing monetary assets. He put forth the 
idea that the efficient portfolios of investors would include both cash and interest-bearing 
monetary assets. The degree of which cash would be preferred would change in relation to the 
interest rate. The higher the interest rate, increasing chances of capital gain, the lesser is the 
preference of cash and vice versa.29
The ideas of Tobin and Markowitz were to be further developed by William Sharpe. Due to 
the changing arena for investments, with risk coming to affect financial transactions, Sharpe 
believed that earlier models for price behaviour were not grounded in more than assertions30. 
Furthermore he believed that no existing theory could describe the links between price of risk 
and such things as investor’s preferences and physical attributes of the capital assets. 
Therefore, he believed that the theories could not explain the relationships between prices and 
risks of assets.31 Sharpe’s interpretation of CAPM has been considered a useful interpretation, 
however with time a more positive interpretation became dominant32. 
The CAPM model was later surveyed by Stephen Ross, the creator of CAPM’s successor, the 
arbitrage pricing theory33. Ross found that the CAPM formula in fact had the same intuitive 
implications for investment as the practices for portfolio selection. These had already been 
used since before the development of portfolio theory by Markowitz.34
However, the CAPM has also received its share of critique. As a positive model, the CAPM 
must be falsifiable by empirical evidence35. The survey conducted by Ross concluded that the 
CAPM could be both observed and tested statistically36. However by the time of Ross’ 
survey, no such test had yet been performed37. Critique against the possibilities of testing the 
CAPM were presented by Roll in 1978. He found that realistically there was no possibility of 
testing CAPM without detailed knowledge of the composition of the market portfolio and 
inclusion of all these assets in the sample. If a proxy for the market portfolio is chosen there is 
a risk that, as long as it is mean variance efficient, the result will support CAPM even if the 
chosen portfolio is inappropriate.38 However, also Roll’s comments received criticism, not 
least from Ross in his survey of the CAPM, that argued that if one was to reason as Roll, it 
would in fact not be possible to test any theory.39
McGoun concludes his analysis of CAPM by stating that “Since all interpretations of the 
CAPM are flawed, there is no rational reason for the success of the model.”40 McGoun 
criticises the model’s ability to provide value for investors and how useful the model is in 
reality. CAPM was built on ideas that existed before its development, thus not contributing to 
                                               
29 Tobin J., Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk (1958), pp. 65, 85-86
30 Sharpe W.F., Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk (1964), p. 425
31 Sharpe W.F., Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk (1964), p. 426
32 McGoun, E. G., The CAPM: A Nobel Failure, (1992), p. 165
33 Ibid., p.165
34 Ibid., pp. 165-166; Ross S.A., The Current Status of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (1978)
35 McGoun, E. G., The CAPM: A Nobel Failure, (1992), p. 166 
36 Ross S.A., The Current Status of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (1978), p. 885
37 Ibid., p. 898
38 Roll R., A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory’s Tests (1977), pp. 130-131
39 Ross S.A., The Current Status of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (1978), p. 893
40 McGoun, E. G., The CAPM: A Nobel Failure, (1992), p. 170
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any new knowledge. In addition McGoun criticises the CAPM’s risk measurement, stating 
that it may not be the best method for estimating risk.41
McGoun presents two reasons, the sociological and the psychological, as to why the CAPM, 
despite winning a Nobel Prize gained its reputation. The sociological explanation centres
around the practitioner community. The CAPM gained popularity as it added to the prestige 
of finance specialists. Further the CAPM was introduced in a time when risk and return were 
becoming more important issues and the CAPM enabled a way to measure performance. 42
The psychological reason presented by McGoun centres around the academic community. 
Several reasons for the popularity of the CAPM are presented. Firstly the Duhem-Quine thesis 
implies that it can be argued that any falsification of a model may not be a failure of the 
theory itself but rather a failure of the assumptions used to test the theory empirically. 
However, the amount of evidence against the CAPM makes it difficult to believe that this 
should be an argument in the case of CAPM. Secondly, the CAPM is the source of many 
reputations within finance, and CAPM also plays a large role in accounting theorisation. 
Thereby those who have gained their reputations with the help of CAPM will be unlikely to 
dispute the beliefs that gained them their reputations. McGoun also proposes that there may 
be no alternative to the CAPM and that this is the reason for its continued existence.43
2.2.2 Value-at-Risk and Risk Modelling in General
Not only have the CAPM and portfolio theory been criticised for not functioning, but this is 
also true for Value-at-risk (VaR) and risk modelling in general44. Value-at-risk was first 
created as a system of quantifying market risk and has since evolved to become a measure of 
integrated market and credit risk as well45. As explained by Ahn et al., “VaR is an estimate of 
the probability and size of the potential loss to be expected over a given period.”46 The 
definition of VaR presented by Philippe Jorian is “VAR summarises the worst loss over a 
target horizon with a given level of confidence.”47
As argued by Daníelsson, all the models of his study were imperfect with various breeches in 
their robustness or having high risk volatility, in fact implying that risk forecasting was not 
much different from a roulette wheel.48 Also Bao et al have criticised the ability to forecast 
risk during crises, stating that it is both more difficult than during stable times, but also that 
the models give poorer results.49
Daníelsson argues that most risk models today are built on the assumption that market data is 
random and dependent on past observations. This in turn, relies upon the hypothesis that there 
                                               
41 McGoun, E. G., The CAPM: A Nobel Failure, (1992), p. 170
42 Ibid., pp. 170-172
43 Ibid., p. 172-174
44 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), pp. 1273, 1275
45 Jorian, P., Value at Risk: The New Benchmark for Managing Financial Risk, (2006), p. 21
46 Ahn, D-H., et.al., Optimal Risk Management Using Options, (1999), p. 360
47 Jorian, P., Value at Risk: The New Benchmark for Managing Financial Risk, (2006), p. 22
48 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), pp. 1273, 1275
49 Bao et al,.Evaluating Predictive Performance of Value-at-Risk Models in Emerging Markets: A Reality Check
(2006) p. 125
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is a great number of market participants whose combined actions are in fact random and do 
not influence the market. This approach to modelling has been criticised for being incorrect. 
Market prices cannot be seen as following an independent random process as risk 
measurements influence people’s behaviour. The difficulties with such models arise in times 
of crisis. This due to the fact that the market data, the foundation of these models, is taken 
from times when there is no crisis. Thus, the model will give only little guidance in times of 
crisis.50
Furthermore Daníelsson argues that risk models are to a certain degree based on assumptions, 
making it impossible to create the perfect risk model51. Also, when a model itself is created 
the quality of the model becomes closely linked with the talents of the creator of the risk 
model and the ability to make correct assumptions52.
When developing risk models one of the basic assumptions is that financial data will remain 
the same in periods of calm as well of crisis. However Daníelsson argues against this belief, 
stating that during crisis people abandon risky investments in assets and revert to safer
investments such as properties. Thus risk models based on data from stable periods will not 
offer correct guidance during a financial crisis.53 As Morris and Shin argue, modern risk-
management techniques have a basis in the belief that the actions of other risk managers will 
not affect the uncertainty of price movements. Thus it is believed that a model based on past 
data will be sufficient to estimate the probabilities of favourable outcomes.54 However as 
stated by Daníelsson, when risk-managers speculate in risk, the nature of the risk changes55.
The problem can be illustrated by looking at the financial crisis in 1997-1998 and the value-
at-risk model which had at that point almost become the universal method for controlling 
market risks. When the crisis broke out, actors on the financial markets all acted in a similar 
manner, that is withdrawing from risky assets to invest in more stable ones. As the 
opportunists who usually took advantage of short-term price differences in assets no longer 
acted in this manner and with investors acting alike and investing in more stable assets, price 
movements were amplified and liquidity decreased. The vast amount of risk managers using 
the value-at-risk method for controlling market risks, amplified the effects of the crisis by 
acting in similar ways.56
Similar actions from a large number of investors did not only amplify the financial crisis 
1997-1998, but this was also true for the 1987 financial crisis. At this time portfolio theory 
was the most frequently used method for managing risk. As Daníelsson explains, these 
strategies worked well in stable periods. However when crisis struck and financial institutions 
strived after identical trading strategies, the futures markets on which the portfolio theory 
relied, could not function. This resulted in an amplification of the effects of the crisis.57  
                                               
50 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), p. 1274
51 Ibid., p. 1274
52 Ibid., p. 1278
53 Ibid., p. 1275
54 Morris S. and Shin Y.S., Risk Management with Interdependent Choice (1999), p. 53
55 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), pp. 1275-1276
56 Ibid., p. 1276, Dunbar N., Inventing Money (2001)
57 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), p. 1276
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Daníelsson argues that as long as financial institutions do not follow the same trading 
strategies, no single strategy can cause a liquidity crisis. However, as risk is not an exogenous 
random variable the actions of each institution will affect the market. Thus, risk models will 
inevitably lead to effects on the distribution of risk. Risk models are based on past actions of 
market participants, if many of the participants, as during crises, follow the same strategies, 
the properties of risk will be affected. Daníelsson thus concludes that as risk properties are not 
the same in stable periods as during crises, risk models will prove to be ineffective and may in 
the end actually amplify the crisis by increasing price swings and causing liquidity 
problems.58
In his study Daníelsson argued that a reliable risk model should give accurate forecasts over a 
wide range of areas; time horizons, assets and different risk levels within one class of assets. 
However he found that none of the models he studied did well in this area, but noted that risk 
managers can identify more accurate models to suit their needs.59 When risk models are 
created the length of historical data series, on which the models are based, tend to centre on
the regulatory suggestion of at least 250 days. This is partly because data may not be available 
for a longer period of time but also due to the fact that a longer series of data may be difficult 
to analyse and create a model from. Studies have shown that the longer the horizon for data 
collection that is used to create the model, the lower the risk volatility and collecting data over 
a shorter period time does not necessarily result in more accurate risk forecasts.60
Another issue causing problems with risk models is that of changing correlations between 
assets in a portfolio. When the value of some assets increases and the value of others decrease 
in a market, the estimated correlation between the assets is higher compared to when the 
markets are both increasing in value. This is further amplified in times of crisis when markets
collapse and the value of all assets decreases, causing a large rise in the correlation between 
the assets. Unfortunately risk models are often created without considering the changes in 
correlation between assets in different situations in the market that arise in times of crisis. 
Thus the models will give too low estimations of portfolio risk.61
Evidence of this behaviour of the correlation between assets has been presented by Erb et al. 
who used semicorrelation analysis to study correlation between markets in different market 
conditions. When two markets were both increasing in value, they found that the correlation 
was lower than if both were decreasing in value or if one market was increasing or one was 
decreasing. Based on their results they found that their correlation forecasts would lead to 
different combinations of assets in portfolios.62
Another problematic issue for risk models is the difficulty of defining the concept of risk. No 
universal definition of risk exists. Daníelsson has attempted to classify the concept in three 
parts; volatility, value-at-risk and coherent risk measures. Volatility is the most basic concept 
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of risk, but this measure is according to Daníelsson somewhat misleading in that volatility 
relies on the idea that returns are normally distributed over time. However such is not the 
case, and by only relying on volatility in making investment choices investors may incorrectly 
select an investment which is in fact more risky, despite having lower volatility.63  
In addition to volatility risk may be measured using value-at risk, which has many positive 
risk measurement attributes. It is fairly easy to implement and is not too difficult to explain to 
users. However, the measure can easily be manipulated and it is possible that the value-at-risk 
of a portfolio may be higher than the measure for each of the assets added together, it is not 
subadditive. Thus diversifying risk through more investments can be interpreted as being 
more risky. Investors should therefore consider to which degree they depend on measures of 
value-at-risk for their investments.64
Another issue with value-at-risk is that it only shows risk in one quantile of the profit and loss 
distribution and the information from this one quantile may not be sufficient or relevant at all 
times. This in combination with the fact that value-at-risk is not subadditive65 has resulted in a 
number of alternative measures of risk. However, limitations have been found for such risk 
measures as well.66
Due to the fact that value-at-risk gives information only on one quantile of the profit and loss 
distribution it furthermore gives users the option of manipulating it.67 Ahn et al. have shown 
how banks can make use of their options to affect the value-at-risk measure, potentially 
causing a decrease in the expected profit and an increase in risk.68
One opinion on risk modelling today is that there is not enough technology to supply reliable 
risk models, in part due to difficulties of defining risk and preventing manipulation of risk 
measurements, making it difficult to use risk models in regulating risk. Authorities are 
demanding minimum levels of capital to be held by banks in order to safeguard against lack 
of capital. However, this capital may not be sensitive to risk, as this will increase the risk that 
financial institutions will have to raise capital in times of crisis, thus amplifying the crisis.69
As can be seen from the discussion above, risk modelling has proved to be ineffective to 
varying degrees. The problems encountered by risk models have also increased in times of 
financial crisis. Now that the Basel II Framework has been in use for a number of years it is 
important to see how it copes as a risk model. This is especially interesting in light of the 
ongoing financial crisis. As Daníelsson argues, Basel II only focuses on the risks that are 
present in times of non-crisis, and thus it may not give much direction in times of financial 
crisis70. 
                                               
63 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002),  pp. 1287-1288
64 Ibid., pp. 1288-1289
65 Artzner et al., Coherent Measures of Risk, (1999), pp. 215-218
66 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), pp.1289-1290; Artzner et al., 
Coherent Measures of Risk, (1999), pp. 203-228; Yamai, Y., Yoshiba, T., Comarative Analysis of Expected
Shortfall and VaR: their estimation error, decomposition, and optimization, (2001), p. 18
67 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), p. 1290
68 Ahn, D-H., et.al., Optimal Risk Management Using Options, (1999), p. 370
69 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), pp. 1292-1293
70 Ibid., p. 1293
17
2.3 Reliance on Numbers 
Today there is a commonly held view among business’ that numbers are important when 
evaluating a performance71 however in current literature many authors are critical to an over-
reliance on numbers72. Porter argues that there has been a growing role of quantitative 
expertise73 and the cons of using numbers are plenty. Numbers can easily be used in different 
places in world since they speak the same language74 and a decision based on numbers is by 
far considered fair and impersonal75. The calculative approach may be appealing to 
researchers, as it enables processing of large amounts of data. Also a quantitative statistical 
survey may easily be translated and used in other nations. Databanks, which may be rather
costly to set up, contain data that can easily be transmitted; it is mobile and can be sold.76 In 
addition to this, quantitative arguments are less easily dismissed than those which are non-
quantitative, as they are seen to be more objective and less opinion-based. Mathematical 
approaches have also gained popularity due to their ability to be used by people of various
cultures, without the difficulties of language barriers that exist in less mathematical subjects.77
There has been a development towards academic papers focusing on mathematical arguments
where research questions are formed to leave out issues that seem unsolvable or too value-
laden. Authors of academic papers present standardised evidence and analytical methods to 
enable tests of the hypothesis. Papers also conform to each other through similar sample-size, 
as few case-studies or small sample-sized papers are published.78
Porter explains the reliance on numbers by arguing that it minimises the need for intimate 
knowledge and personal trust79. Many take comfort in knowing that they have used 
standardised procedures giving evidence of a certain reliance on numbers.80 The tradition of 
believing in numbers can further be explained by people being convinced of the superiority of 
numbers, it is explained by social relationships.81
Chua presents several explanations to the calculative tradition, categorising them into rational, 
social psychological and sociological reasons. A rational reason would be that there are no 
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viable options.82 Other options have received criticism for being to broad or multifaceted to be 
approached by a mathematical model83. 
The social psychological answer as to why the natural sciences and the empirical/calculative 
tradition have dominated accounting research discusses whether this tradition has reached a 
degree of familiarity among researchers, making it difficult to abandon.84
Chua implies that the sociological answer to the question will centre around the fact that 
research tradition is institutionalised in research networks such as universities, doctoral 
programs and journals85. Chua further argues along the lines of the sociological answer;
“Thus, the empirical/calculative research tradition persists in part because 
it is constituted by a global, actor-network that supplies it with key 
resources – graduate students, research funds and cultural capital.”86
Porter argues that the language of quantity is attempting since it is structured and rule-
bound87. However, despite the fact that a calculative culture is dominant in accounting 
research, it is still important to consider its risks and limitations. The calculative traditions of 
quantification and proceduralisation risk dehumanising the data and leaving out moral 
debates. The problems with numbers tend to surface, when numbers are taken out of their 
context and used as absolute neutral truths, when the belief in numbers becomes too great.88
According to Chua, numbers are not enslaving. Though, it becomes dangerous when numbers 
are taken to be neutral absolute and “their persuasive power is decontextualised (both 
culturally and historically), their limitations as modes of representing social life are 
downplayed and their dominance rules out all debates about the political ideals and values 
which quantification itself expresses confront”.89 It gets worrying when researchers, who try
to build general models with the intent to predict behaviour, do not tackle the issue of 
numbers being imperfect90. Furthermore, if people use numbers without knowledge of how 
they were calculated, they become bound to these numbers since they cannot interpret and see
the information behind them91. 
2.4 Statements and Misstatements
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In addition to studies focusing on people’s beliefs in numbers and calculations, there are other 
studies that have focused on people’s beliefs in statements. When papers are written, authors 
make use of literary inscription in attempt to persuade the readers. However as long as there is 
evidence that the author has tried to persuade the reader, the reader will not be convinced. At 
the same time, in some cases readers may regard facts in themselves to be correct. There is a 
link between literary inscription and facts. Readers perceive a text as containing facts or being 
about facts only when they no longer perceive a debate or the use of literary inscription. 
However the facts of a statement may just as easily be undercut by pointing out the literary 
inscription used to create the fact.92
Different types of statements exist today and they have been found to vary in how fact-like 
they are. As such studies have been undertaken to further investigate the existence of 
statements.93
One of the extreme sides of statements includes those where readers have been persuaded of a 
fact to the degree that no reference to them is needed. Statements consisting of such facts are 
labelled type five statements. Facts in such statements are taken for granted and they are 
mainly used when trying to argue for other facts. The facts that are taken for granted are 
difficult to spot as they are merged with routine enquiry, skills and tacit knowledge. Often 
such facts have been through earlier discussions, emerging as noncontentious facts.94
The type four statements make more explicit statements and do so in the form of sentences 
that describe the relationship between two units. The type four statements are mainly used to 
spread already accepted knowledge through for example text books.95
Type three statements are similar to the type four statements in the way that they also take the 
form of sentences that describe the relationship between two units. However in type three 
statements, the description contains a statement about another statement, a modality. If this 
modality were removed the type three statement would become a type four statement. The 
difference between these types of statements can be identified by looking at the wording of 
the statement. A statement that states that something is (type four) is different from a 
statement stating that something is reported to be (type three).96
Type two statements have been found to resemble claims rather than accepted or established 
facts. The type two statements draw the reader’s attention to what is generally known or to 
what could reasonably be expected. These statements may also take the form of suggestions 
as to what could be further studied.97
Compared to the type two to five statements above, type one statements consist of 
speculations about the relationship between two units.98
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It is also possible to alter statements causing them to become another type of statement. As 
such a type three statement can become for example a type four statement. This can be 
achieved in one of two ways. Firstly the modality of a statement can be altered, causing the 
statement to become more or less fact-like. Secondly is using a statement already in existence 
and thereby enhancing or lessening how fact-like the new statement appears.99
In addition to the matter of types of statements and how these are transformed, there is the 
matter of acceptance of statements. Latour and Woolgar write “…an important factor in the 
acceptance of a statement was the recognition by others of another statement which was 
similar.”100 The existence of more than one statement has been seen as evidence of an 
external object or an objective condition. As the object was considered external the 
subjectivity of the statement would disappear and the statement would be considered more 
fact-like. In addition to this the weight of statements can be modified by making use of 
reference to other documents and also my using words such as “maybe” or “unlikely”. For 
example if a someone were to comment on a statement, saying that there are no other 
documents reaching the same conclusion, the weight of the statement would be decreased.101
2.5 Decentralisation – a more successful organisation structure
In the 1970 Handelsbanken faced a major crisis with low profitability and conflicts with the 
authorities. In order to meet this crisis the bank made changes to the organisation and became 
radically decentralised.102
Compared to the other banks in Sweden, the decentralised Handelsbanken has performed 
well. In 1999 Wallander stated that the new policy of the bank had a higher profitability than 
the mean of the other Swedish banks.103 During the last thirty six years, Handelsbanken has 
had a higher profitability than their competitors. Further, according to their studies, they have 
had the most satisfied customers, this since 1989 when the measuring started.104  
In his article from 1999, Wallander talks about the consequences of strong centralised 
budgeting. A budget is a forecast for the company’s following year and is built on the general 
development of demand, prices, exchange rates, wages, costs and so on.105 Wallander states 
that if you make this kind of forecast, what you are really saying to employees is that they 
should continue to work as they are doing. But, in reality, you do not need a budget system to 
tell them that.106
                                               
99 Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life – The Construction of Scientific Facts, (1986), p. 83
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 84
102 Wallander, J., Budgeting - an unnecessary evil, (1999), p. 405
103 Ibid., p. 406
104 www.handelsbanken.se
105 Wallander, J., Budgeting - an unnecessary evil, (1999), p. 410
106 Ibid., pp. 410-411
21
Furthermore, Wallander argues about the difficulty to foresee the changes in the economic 
situation with help from the budget. Instead, the budget will rather make it more difficult to 
adjust to these changes. According to Wallander, there is no point in having a budget if you 
do not believe in it. But, if you do believe in it, you will have a strong tendency to look at 
deviations as accidental happenings. Thus, there is a strong risk that the budget will not be 
helpful and it will therefore be harder to adjust to the new circumstances.107
In addition to this Wallander’s opinion is that a complicated system will not solve the 
problems108. According to him, it is important that the organisation has a general goal and 
follows the same course; though at the same time it is important for the organisation to be 
ready for changes. When determining the general goal, it is important that it is in line with the 
company’s philosophy. A future distant target is not as important since this may be hard to 
reach, this because of the high probability of changes along the way. Most often there will be 
changes in factors that will influence your business. With this in mind, it will be necessary to 
be able to adjust the course of the company.109  
Wallander argues that it is important to get the employees involved in their work and that this 
is more easily achieved with smaller units with a degree of independence, he believes in 
decentralisation110. The strength of a decentralised organisation is confirmed with the result of 
Swedish Handelsbanken which has been one of the most cost-efficient universal banks in 
Europe. Further during a long time the bank had lower credit loss than its competitors111.
2.6 Basel II – advantageous for centralised management
In a study conducted by Wahlström in 2009, positive opinions of the Basel II Framework 
were expressed. However, these opinions were most frequently expressed by employees from
centralised banks. As an example, they thought it created a more efficient internal systems 
and control of risk.112 On the other hand, there have also been negative opinions. Among 
these, there was a common fear that the Basel II Framework promotes increased 
centralisation.113
Centralised organisations are characterised by high power distance114. According to
Wahlström’s study, the support for the Basel II Framework was more frequently expressed by 
respondents in centralised banks. The Basel II Framework has an emphasis on measuring risk
using numbers, which leads to uniformity in the banks.115 This uniformity was viewed in a 
positive way by people who believed it improved control of risk. Both uniformity and 
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improved systems of control where viewed as pleasing effects by those in favour of the 
framework’s advantages for centralised organisations.116 Further, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision constantly engages the banking industry to discuss risk management and 
in particular to produce quantified measures of risk117.
The fact that the Basel II framework leads to control and uniformity results in a concentration 
of power at headquarters, thus the Basel II Framework enhanced the value of centralised 
management.118
Wahlström found that some of the common fears expressed by people working at 
decentralised banks were a potential lack of applicability of the models in practise, that the 
framework was overly resource intensive and that the framework would lead to disadvantages 
for decentralised banks119. This difference in opinions regarding centralised and decentralised 
banks can be explained by different studies. According to these studies, people are more open
to change when it matches their pre-existing beliefs.120 And in this case, the Basel II 
Framework was less in line with the organisation of a decentralised management structure121.
Wahlström found that employees at decentralised banks felt that the Basel II Framework was 
more in line with centralised management122.
Different organisations work in separate ways and do not always have the same opinion. This 
phenomenon was illustrated in Wahlström’s research. The centralised banks were of the 
opinion that the competence of the bank was shown by the ability to develop models, collect 
data and gain approval of Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. People in this kind of 
organisation felt comfortable with risk measures. There was tendency among the employees 
towards feeling safe based on the idea that the information from risk measurements would 
reduce the risk of “bad” clients. However, people in decentralised banks put greater emphasis 
on establishing personal relationship with customers. They were convinced of the advantage
of knowing the customer personally.123 When explaining his results Wahlström argued that 
the opinions of the decentralised bank was not surprising as “These bank officers were more 
unreceptive to a regulation that could threaten their current frame of reference as far as 
management structure.”124 Wahlström, in his own words “unsurprisingly”, also came across 
opinions from the decentralised bank in his study that said that Basel II would increase 
centralisation in the banks at the expense of a more decentralised structure, with more 
delegation to branches125.
With this new framework, the creation models and collection data was concentrated to the 
headquarters. When new measurements are introduced, this move of responsibilities is not 
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uncommon.126 Since the new framework demands that employees report to headquarters, a 
decentralised system becomes undesirable127. 
Among Swedish banks, there is a tradition of decentralised management128. According to 
Wahlström’s study, if the Basel II Framework is fully implemented, Swedish banks will have 
to make adjustments to their overall management structure. However he argues, the demand 
for using the information on risk measurement on a daily basis are likely to be 
“…troublesome for banks accustomed to operating under decentralised management”.129
2.7 Variations in Risk Measures in Practice
According to Power, there has been an explosion of risk management practises130. One 
philosophy adopted by many banks is that of enterprise risk management (ERM). However,
Mikes argues that there is little notion of how ERM works in practice131 and according to 
other studies in management control, systematic variations of ERM might exist in practise132. 
When analysing ERM in practice there are two powerful corporate governance approaches; 
the shareholder value drive and the risk-based internal control mechanism. The shareholder 
value drive supports control practises which are designed to focus on the creation of value. 
The risk-base internal control mechanism includes non-financial aspects and focuses on 
maintaining appropriate business behaviour.133  
The study done by Mikes in 2009 involves two large banking organisations. She called these 
Gotebank and Fraser Bank. Gotebank’s top management was more sceptical towards risk 
quantification and put less effort on risk techniques. On the other hand, Fraser Bank had a 
strong enthusiasm for risk quantification and there was a common understanding that risk 
numbers gave a fair view of risk profiles.134   
Mikes’ study found variations in ERM in practice135. The study identifies two variations of 
ERM models. The first one is driven by strong shareholder value imperative, called ERM by 
numbers. When using ERM by numbers, the practices are formed to encourage value creation. 
ERM by numbers “has a vision of uniting and controlling risk” in a common framework, 
hence there is a quantitative enthusiasm. Management primarily works with and prefers risk 
measures that can be quantified.136 The second model is holistic ERM, which is driven by 
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demands of the risk-based internal control imperative137. In this approach, the management is 
more sceptical towards quantification. Further, they exercise risk in a more flexible manner 
and it requires risk officers to have considerable knowledge of the businesses whose risk they 
are monitoring.138 Hence, what needs to be considered within corporate governance is that 
these two variations might give rise to different calculative cultures139.
Different behaviour was recognised in the two approaches. In Gotebank, ‘red signals’ were 
viewed as learning opportunities, whereas, in Fraser Bank, they reacted to these by correcting 
the risk profile. Though, in the Fraser Bank, reports on red signals were not frequently viewed 
by top management.140 Instead the role of the red alarm was diagnostic141. 
According to the study, Gotebank had a more holistic approach to ERM. Their approach 
included different risk measures that were not quantifiable, and the definition of risk was 
broad in order to enable the inclusion of the treatment of different events.142 On the contrary, 
Fraser Bank’s risk-based management was strongly dependent on its risk measurement and 
integrated risk management, they had a more numeric approach to ERM143.
New control systems pose a challenge to organisations as they need to “establish their own 
voice and language in order to provide organizational debates”144. The tools for risk 
management are often highly analytical, data-driven techniques. However, these tools tend be 
different in different cultures.145 The alignment between the cultural foundation of the new 
system and the attitude of the intended users will affect the success of management 
information.146 For example in Mikes’ study there was a big difference in the views of merits 
and limitations of risk management tools between Gotebank and Fraser Bank147. As an 
explanation to the differences in the attitude of the users, Mikes introduces the phenomenon 
of calculative cultures148. Distinguishing between calculative cultures, separating calculative 
idealism and calculative pragmatism, increases the understanding of different attitudes 
towards analytical tools, such as ERM149. Within organisations with tendencies towards risk 
pragmatism, there is less trust in numbers and information from risk measures are considered
trend indicators150.  On the other hand calculative idealistic tendencies contribute to a greater 
trust in numbers and users believe that the risk measures are capable of reflecting reality. In 
addition to this, users put a lot of effort into maintaining and improving risk measurement.151
Mikes argues that senior officers will base their approach to managing risk on earlier 
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experiences and for example their first encounter with ERM practises. She argues that the 
calculative cultures “both influence and is influenced by” the choice of analytical model.152
2.8 Chapter Summary 
To sum up the chapter on literature, Young has argued that even though risk is seen as 
something negative, it can be measured and hence may be controlled. However, many models 
for risk measurement have been roughly criticised. According to McGoun, all interpretations 
of CAPM are flawed and Daníelsson argues that most risk models today are built on the 
assumption that market data is random. But according to him, this is an incorrect approach to 
use since risk measurements influence people’s behaviour. Furthermore, according to Porter 
there has been a growing role of quantitative expertise and Chua explains this by people being 
convinced of the superiority of numbers. Latour and Woolgar argue that some statements are 
taken for granted and explain that the existence of more than one statement has been seen as 
evidence of an external object or an objective condition. Historically the decentralised 
Swedish Bank Handelsbanken has had higher profitability than their competitors. Though, the 
Basel II framework leads to control and uniformity results in a concentration of power at 
headquarters and is hence more in line with a centralised management. In addition to this
Mikes has studied two banks and is arguing that there are variations in risk measures in 
practise. She identified two variations of ERM; first ERM by numbers which has a vision of 
uniting and controlling risk in a common framework. The second model is holistic ERM 
where the management is more sceptical against quantification.
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3. Method
This chapter will describe the research approach used in this study and the reasons for 
choosing this approach. Further, a description is made over how this study was conducted, as 
well as a presentation of the primary and secondary data. The chapter continues with the
chosen respondents and the reasoning behind the sampling. This is followed by a section on 
source criticism to strengthen the reliability and validity of the study. Finally, the chapter 
ends with a description of how the authors aim to analyse their data and a report over 
alternative ways of performing the study. 
3.1 Qualitative Approach
This study has been conducted using a qualitative approach. This approach involves the 
notion of studying a person’s opinions and experiences as opposed to a quantitative approach, 
which mainly produces numeric results.153 The qualitative approach is useful when studying
people’s thoughts and when the study involves analysis of documents154. This approach was
the most appropriate to illustrate the focus question since the intent was to examine how the 
Basel II framework was practically applied in banks of different organisational structure and 
the banks’ opinions in the matter. The intent was not to collect any yes or no answers. The use 
of a qualitative approach enabled the authors to study the opinions of Basel II in greater depth 
than if a qualitative approach had been used155. Another reason for performing a qualitative 
study is that the authors aimed to gather data that would allow us to deeply pursue our subject 
and show the nuances that exist therein156. 
The collected data enables conclusions as to the practical application of the Basel II 
Framework to be drawn. However, due to the small sample size of this qualitative study and 
the fact that the respondents have been chosen for a specific purpose, it is not possible to draw 
any general conclusions as would be possible if a quantitative approach had been used.157 The 
conclusions reached will be closely linked to the respondents158. The study focuses on finding 
information about the nuances of the subject rather than looking at a larger sample of the 
population. It is common for the qualitative approach to study a smaller sample but reaching 
individuals with the right position or the right information159. 
In contrast to the qualitative approach, a quantitative approach studies a larger sample of the 
population. The aim is that the sample will enable the researcher to draw general conclusions 
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for a larger part of the population with a certain degree of certainty and. A study with a 
quantitative approach is normally conducted by making use of statistical procedures and 
results of the study can be reproduced. Hence, it allows the researcher to draw broader
conclusions.160
The practical use of the qualitative approach emerges from openness towards the 
respondents161. The approach is perceived as an open method where the researcher does not
try to control the information when collecting it. The information is categorised first after it 
has been collected.162 The chosen approach is suitable when few entities are interviewed, 
when the individual person’s opinions are of interest and when the researchers are interested 
in how the interviewed respondent interprets the issue163. This makes the qualitative approach 
an appropriate choice for how the authors wish to study the focus question. 
There are many favourable sides to the chosen approach. It sets few limits to the answers of 
the respondent and allows the researcher to examine details and unique angles with every 
interview respondent.164 This provided an opportunity of collecting more detailed answers 
used to clarify any nuances when comparing the different structural banks. The downside is 
that there is seldom a possibility to draw general conclusions based on the collected material, 
since the respondents are not chosen from a random basis.165
3.1.1 Inductive Approach
An inductive approach, implicating a move from empirical data towards theory, has been used 
in conducting this study. The researcher performs empirical studies of reality and then uses 
this information to draw theoretical conclusions. In the ideal situation the researcher
commences the study completely without expectations, with the intent of letting respondents 
describe their perceptions of their worlds in their own terms.166 It is an open approach with the 
vision that nothing shall limit the collected information167. As mentioned above, the authors
have used a qualitative approach in this study. Qualitative approaches are to a large extent 
inductive since qualitative approaches are more opened toward new information. This in 
difference to a quantitative approach, which is deductive to a larger extent since the researcher 
categorises the information before it is collected.168
The authors aimed to draw theoretical conclusions of their own based on the empirical data 
gathered from interviews. The study aims to contribute to a greater insight in how banks of 
different organisational structure practically apply the Basel II Framework and their opinions 
regarding this. Thus, the study is in line with the inductive approach. The idea of presenting a 
study without any prior expectations on part of the authors is of course not possible, since it is 
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not possible to recognise a field of study without orientation169. Hence, the main problem is 
that nobody can have a completely open mind unaffected by information and expectations, 
why the result will not be completely objective170. In order to tackle this problem the authors 
wrote down the main interview questions at an early stage, before the phenomenon of Basel II
had been studied in depth, thereby minimising the risk of prior expectations influencing the 
result of the study and the creation of interview questions. Further, the intent was to compare 
the application of Basel II in banks of different organisational structure. Information as to the 
practical application was not something the authors could learn in advance.
To apply the results as a general theory, a deductive approach is needed where the theory is 
tested in reality on a larger number of banks. In contrast to the inductive approach, the 
deductive approach implies a move from theory to empirical observations.171
3.1.2 Phenomenology
Phenomenology is concerned with examining how people experience a certain phenomenon, 
experiences of it, memories, or how people make sense of it. The authors have therefore 
conducted in-depth interviews with people who have come in direct contact with the 
phenomenon, Basel II and its practical application. The fundamental idea of phenomenology 
centres on the examination of how people describe and experience through their senses. 
Furthermore focus is put on how people interpret and make sense of their experiences. As 
such, when studying the phenomenon it was of great importance that the authors made use of 
either observations or in-depth interviews. Furthermore, phenomenologists have a belief in the 
essence of a shared experience. Therefore the authors have compared the experiences of 
different people, in order to determine the essence of the phenomenon.172
When gathering data for our thesis, the aim was to create an understanding of the 
phenomenon which was studied. This is in line with the phenomenological approach that can 
be divided into seven steps. These are: the experience, the ideation, the generalisation, the 
nuances, the constitution, the reduction and the interpretation of the phenomenon. The 
experience of the phenomenon encompasses the observation of as well as the analysis and 
reporting of it. The process begins with observing the phenomenon. Thereafter it is analysed 
and the process is completed by describing it. The goal is to find the essence of the
phenomenon through one’s own interpretation. As researchers however, the authors must rely 
on other people’s experiences of the phenomenon that is being studied. In the process of the 
ideation of the phenomenon, there is a move from a concrete description of the phenomenon 
to one which is more abstract, trying to identify the nature of the phenomenon. In the process 
of generalising the phenomenon the authors attempt to identify fundamental prerequisites for 
the nature of it, the aim is to generalise from one phenomenon to several others, as to draw 
conclusions of the original phenomenon. When studying the nuances of the phenomenon the 
aim is to identify the existence of the phenomenon in different situations, looking at it from 
different angles, backgrounds and settings. The constitution of the phenomenon can be 
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described as an ongoing perceptive and cognitive process by which the idea of the 
phenomenon is completed. The reduction process of the phenomenon implies that the authors
shall reconsider our perceptions of the phenomenon. The final step in studying the 
phenomenon is the interpretation of it; however, a phenomenologist does not consider 
explanations or concealed ideas of the phenomenon.173
3.1.3 Grounded theory
In addition to what has been said above, the aim is to create theory through the methods 
proposed by grounded theory. Grounded theory aims at creating theory, something which is 
achieved through comparing and connecting induction and deduction. Furthermore grounded 
theory aims to give the researcher the possibility of seeing alternate meanings of a 
phenomenon. In generating theories there is a need for methods which enable the researcher 
to gather empirical data from the real world. In order to achieve this, the authors have 
conducted interviews with a number of respondents. Furthermore grounded theory emphasises 
the objectivity of the researcher in order to ensure reasonable findings and representation of a 
phenomenon without bias. As Patton summarises grounded theory, it is a realist and 
objectivist approach that focuses on discipline and structured procedures as methods for 
reducing any potential bias of the researcher while at the same time allowing the researcher to 
be somewhat creative when analysing results.174
In grounded theory the design, methods of data collection, analysis and the theory generated 
thereof, all show traces of a systematic approach175. This is to ensure that the reader knows 
exactly how the resulting theory has been generated. Furthermore, researchers following 
grounded theory leave nothing to chance; the approach provides instructions for every step of 
the way. The study has been structured in line with this, both in terms of the gathering of data 
but also the analysis of the results. Grounded theory is concerned with creating theories that 
exemplify phenomena in the real world. Grounded theorists have been described as portraying 
a number of characteristics. These are the ability to critically analyse situations, to recognise 
whether or not there is a case of bias, possessing the ability to think abstractly, having a 
flexible approach to criticism, the ability to be sensitive to respondents and how the phrase 
and act when responding to questions and finally they have a devotion to the work process.176
A grounded theorist will have a certain process when collecting and analysing data to create a 
theory of the real world phenomenon. The process is initiated by basic descriptions of the 
phenomenon. The data gathered from these descriptions is later organised into categories as 
variables based on such things as properties and dimensions. Descriptions are further used in 
order to get a clearer picture of the data and any present patterns. The grounded theorist will 
thereafter attempt to create theories based on this data, trying to logically explain the 
phenomenon.177 The study consists of gathering information from the real world, concerning 
Basel II in order to create theory as to the practical application of this. 
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3.2 Data Collection
Data collection for this thesis will be a combination of primary and secondary data sources. 
One of the reasons behind this is that by using several different types of sources to better 
judge the reliability of the sources. Several sources that support each other can strengthen the 
reliability of our results.178
3.2.1 Primary Data
The primary data sources for this thesis are a number of interviews conducted with two 
Swedish banks and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen. 
Primary data is collected directly by the researcher for the study in question179. 
In order to gather data for this thesis a number of individual and open interviews with 
representatives from two Swedish banks and The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
have been conducted. This method of data collection is appropriate for the purpose of the
study as the authors wish to study only a few samples. Conducting face-to-face interviews is 
time-consuming and can also result in a large amount of data that is difficult to overlook, 
adding to the reasons for only studying a few samples. Conducting individual and open 
interviews is also appropriate for the study as it seeks to collect the views of the individual; 
however the result of this is that no conclusions that are valid for a larger group of people can 
be drawn. Furthermore the individual and open interview gives the opportunity of 
understanding how the individual interprets a specific phenomenon.180
The aim was to conduct all of the interviews face-to-face but in cases where this was not 
possible the respondents were interviewed over the phone. One of the downsides of 
conducting interviews over the phone is that the respondent may be less keen on discussing 
sensitive matters. By interviewing over the phone it is more difficult to establish a connection 
of trust with the interviewee. Furthermore, studies have shown that the respondent may be 
more inclined not to tell the truth in an interview conducted over the phone than one 
conducted face-to-face. In addition to this, there is an opinion that if an interview contains 
mainly open-ended questions, a face-to-face interview is more appropriate as it, compared to a 
telephone interview, is easier to establish an open discussion in such a setting.181 Moreover 
the face-to-face interview enables the interviewer to pose more complicated questions than 
what would have been possible over the phone182. In cases where telephone interviews have 
been necessary it has not been possible to directly observe the person that is being 
interviewed. There is a risk of encountering difficulties, as it is not possible to observe the 
respondent’s reactions to the questions, making it difficult to assess how comfortable the 
respondent is with the question. This may affect how the respondent chooses to answer the 
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question, not wanting to give away more than necessary if they are uncomfortable. However, 
despite this the authors chose rather to conduct an interview over the phone instead of having 
no interview at all. As the authors wanted to reach specific people, it was not an option to 
choose another respondent. There are also some positive aspects to the times telephone 
interviews have been necessary. Due to the anonymity of telephone interviews, the researcher 
may decrease the effect of the interviewer on the respondent. The presence of the interviewer 
can contribute to a change in behaviour of the interviewee, as the interviewee notices the body 
language of the interviewer and reacts to this.183
The individual and open interviews have consisted of a combination of standardised and 
open-ended questions yet giving room to pursue areas of interest that may arise during the 
interview. During the interviews an interview guide with questions, focusing on certain issues, 
has been used. This was done in order to ensure that the interview covered all areas of that 
needed for the study. Furthermore the form of the interviews made sure that time was used 
efficiently and it also allows for easier analysis and comparison of the results.184 The 
questions have also been adapted based on the respondents. This was done in order to enable 
the authors to pose questions based on how knowledgeable the respondents were in different 
areas. Some questions may be difficult for an employee at a smaller office to answer 
wherefore the authors chose to pose some questions only to the central organisations.  
Concerning the setting of the face-to-face interviews the authors have chosen to conduct the
interviews in environments common to the interviewees, visiting them at their offices. The 
interviews took place in meeting rooms where the conversation was not overheard by others. 
Conducting interviews in environments both familiar and non-familiar to the respondent may 
have both positive and negative effects on the interview. However, the authors believe that an 
environment common to the interviewee may make them feel more relaxed.185 Regarding the 
telephone interviews the authors were not able to affect the environment that the respondent 
was in. Furthermore in order to make all of the respondents comfortable the authors chose to 
conduct the interviews in the interviewees’ mother tongue, Swedish. The authors believe that 
as this is the respondents’ mother tongue they may more easily be able to express themselves. 
Hence the interviews have been translated into English. 
Despite the risk of affecting the answers of the respondents, the authors have chosen to be 
open with the objective of the interviews that have been conducted. The reason behind this is 
the difficulties of obtaining interviews without being open with the objective of the study and 
the interview. Being open with the interview may also decrease any discomfort on the part of 
the respondent for not being sure of the objective of the interview. Such discomfort could 
perhaps cause the respondent to become more cautious and thus disclose less information186
Throughout the interviews the answers of our respondents have been recorded. The reason 
behind this is that the interview becomes more natural if it can be conducted as a 
conversation, keeping eye contact with the respondent and the conversation moving forward. 
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Some notes have been taken during the interview, but not to the degree of which the 
conversation became continuously interrupted.187 Unfortunately the authors were not given 
permission to record all of the interviews. In two cases the authors instead had to rely on 
taking notes by hand during the interview. In order to keep the conversation as natural as 
possible the authors in such cases chose to appoint one of themselves as interviewer and the 
other as note taker. The person who interviewed the respondent still took notes but too a lesser 
degree.
3.2.2 Secondary Data
In order to complete this thesis secondary data sources have been used. Secondary data does 
not originate from studies undertaken by the researcher. Secondary data is collected by 
looking at information gathered by others.188
Secondary data has been included in order to gather further information as to how other 
people have interpreted similar situations or related phenomena. These sources are less 
spontaneous than interviews and the information may have been altered for a specific 
purpose. However, the secondary sources of data can also have been more thoroughly 
overlooked and we have had to be more critical to our choice of sources.189 The secondary 
sources have been used to compare other studies that may not directly have been conducted 
about Basel II but still have relevance in relation to our study of its practical application. 
In using secondary data the authors have been aware of the fact that such data has been 
assembled for other purposes than that of this study. In addition to this the authors have had to 
consider which information that is useful for us, as well as the fact that the original data of the 
secondary source may have been altered in order to fit the purpose of the study. The authors
did not have access to the original data and thus they do not know what the researcher chose 
to include and what not to include when presenting the data.190
3.2.3 Sampling
When choosing respondents to the interviews, the aim has not been to interview a large 
number of people. Instead a decision has been made to go along with the more typically 
qualitative approach and in greater depth study fewer samples. The authors have also chosen 
to interview those who are well-informed in this area of research. This has been done in order 
to learn about central issues concerning Basel II that are important to the study.191
The first selection regarding the respondents was the type of bank at which they worked. The 
aim was to interview respondents from two Swedish banks. In order to fulfil the intent of this 
study the authors wanted to look at one centralised and one decentralised bank. Furthermore 
to maintain a certain degree of comparability between the banks, banks of similar size were 
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chosen. The choice fell upon larger Swedish banks because the authors believed that the 
organisational structure of these banks would be more apparent as compared to smaller banks. 
The respondents were divided into two categories, based on the type of bank in which they 
work. The authors have focused on respondents from one centralised and one decentralised 
Swedish bank. This was done in order to analyse any differences as a result of centralisation 
or decentralisation of the bank. Furthermore the respondents were divided into categories 
based on their position and location in the bank. The aim was to achieve a spread between 
respondents from the banks’ central organisations and local offices in order to analyse any 
differences in practical application of Basel II throughout the entire banks. The authors did 
not only want a central opinion on what people higher up in the organisational hierarchy 
thought that other parts of the organisation were doing. For a more detailed description of the 
respondents, the reader may see appendix 1. 
When finding the respondents the authors have made use of what is known as snowball 
sampling. This was found to be suitable for the study as it enabled the authors to contact those 
who were well-informed about Basel II. In order to find suitable respondents the authors 
described the errand and asked the switchboard operators to refer them to someone within the 
banks. When the authors reached the person in question they once again described the errand 
and asked if the respondent felt they could help or otherwise if the authors could be referred to 
someone more appropriate. Often a number of independent sources referred the authors to the 
same person, convincing the authors that this was a well-informed respondent. The authors
also made use of the interviewees and after completing the interview the respondent was 
asked if they knew of someone else the authors should interview.192
When choosing the secondary sources, the authors have aimed at finding sources of high 
quality. As such the authors have looked for authors with a great deal of knowledge of and 
competence in the area they are studying. In order to maintain a high degree of quality in the
secondary sources the authors have primarily used scientific articles that have been published 
in renowned journals.193
3.3 Source Criticism
3.3.1 Reliability
To generate a trustworthy result the authors needed a methodological approach that gave 
stable and reliable results, in other words the study needed to be reliable. A study with high 
reliability means that the same or similar results can be reached irrespective of who performs 
the study and of entities are reviewed.194 In addition, reliability also entails the notion of 
whether the results of a study are repeatable195.
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This study focuses on the practical application of the Basel II Framework in two Swedish 
banks today, the same results may not be reached if the study is replicated in five or ten years. 
With time regulation will change in order to adapt to evolving markets and banks may as such 
face new expectations. Hence, it might not be possible to replicate the study. 
Furthermore, since the authors have chosen to perform the study by looking at two specific 
Swedish banks the conclusions cannot be generalised. The results depend on the reviewed 
entities. Also, the results of the study are to a great deal dependent on the respondents. As 
such, other respondents may produce different results. However as stated above, it was never 
the intent to draw general conclusions; instead the intent is to examine these two banks and 
their opinions at this point in time. 
One main threat to the reliability is the notion of how the researcher has registered the data. 
The reliability can be weakened if you fail in the transcription196. It is important to be cautious 
when registering data as no one can remember a large amount of detailed information.197 With 
this in mind, a recorder has been used for a majority of the interviews and as such the 
interviews could be reproduced at any point. For the remaining two interviews where the 
authors could not record, one person focused entirely on note taking in order to record as 
much as possible. 
Another threat to the reliability is the effect of the authors as interviewers. The authors were 
well aware that their behaviour could have an impact on the answers of the respondents.198 To 
manage this, the authors tried not to act either uninvolved or be to bold in their behaviour and 
the questions they asked. Instead the authors tried to have a neutral profile towards the 
interviewee. 
3.3.2 Validity
It is of great importance that the study is conducted with a high degree of validity, as to assure 
that the correctness of the results and conclusions drawn thereof199. 
There are two important aspects of validity that the authors must be aware of, internal and
external validity. Internal validity is concerned with whether or not the method of data 
collection, in our case interviews, actually measure what they intend to200. The internal 
validity can be measured without any need of empirical data, in fact it concerns the degree of 
which a variable and how it is measured correspond with each other201. It also concerns the 
degree of correspondence between observations and the ideas that result from these202. 
An important aspect when analysing the internal validity is asking if the researcher has been 
able to interview the correct sources. This is of importance as the sources provide the study
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with the information on which the conclusions are based.203 When choosing interviewees the 
authors have interviewed those with specialist knowledge about Basel II. In the local offices 
of the banks it has not always been possible to find a Basel II-specialist but the interviewee 
has then been a person who works with areas connected to Basel II and who also felt that they 
had enough knowledge to answer the questions. In order to ensure that the person felt 
competent enough to answer our questions, the respondent was supplied with further 
information regarding the proposed questions. 
Another aspect of internal validity concerns whether or not the respondents give correct 
information. When choosing respondents the authors have therefore looked at a number of 
issues. The first is whether or not the respondent is well-informed about the phenomenon that 
is being studied. Furthermore the aim was to interview those who worked with Basel II, as 
opposed to someone who did not have any first-hand experience of working with the 
framework. However, to complement the empirical material the authors have made use of 
secondary sources such information gathered by other researchers on the subject. The risk 
with using secondary sources is that they may have been subject to bias by the researcher 
presenting his or her results. However, the authors believe that there is a need for these 
sources, but a critical approach when looking at which of these sources to include in the study
has been used. Another issue that the authors looked at when choosing respondents was how 
knowledgeable the respondent was about the subject of study. Hence, respondents who have 
worked with Basel II, and in their own view were updated on the subject, were chosen. The 
authors have also looked for interviewees who have worked with Basel II for a number of 
years as they also wanted to ask questions about the implementation of Basel II, a process that 
has required a number of years.204
Another important issue concerning the respondents was their willingness to give truthful 
information205. Basel II may not be considered a sensitive subject, yet banks may not be 
willing to give information proving that application of the framework is not being handled in 
accordance with the regulations. Local offices may not be willing do disclose that they do not 
actually work in accordance with directions given from the bank’s headquarters. In order to 
tackle this problem the authors have chosen not to disclose the names of the interviewees nor 
which banks they work for. The respondents have been informed of this, in hope that this will 
encourage them to speak more freely. Furthermore attempts have been made to formulate 
questions in a way that will encourage the respondents to disclose as much information as 
possible. A method of handling the problem of respondents not being willing to tell the truth 
is by using several sources to corroborate what a source has said206. A number of people have 
therefore been interviewed within each bank. However, it has been difficult to find several 
people within one office to interview. The authors were often referred back to the original 
interviewee and with the difficulties of finding several interviewees at smaller offices the 
authors decided to be satisfied with only one respondent from each office. 
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The concept of validity also includes external validity that concerns whether or not general 
conclusions based on the research results can be drawn207. There is a tendency for qualitative 
studies to be weak in this area due to the fact that these studies often focus on smaller 
samples208. Due to the small size of this sample, there is a greater risk that the sample is not 
representative for the larger population209. Instead of including a representative sample of 
respondents in this study the authors have chosen to interview those with insight in the chosen 
subject. This is because the authors believe that this will enable them to venture deeper into 
the subject. The purpose of the study is not to draw conclusions for a larger population, but 
instead to focus on a smaller group, and thus the external validity will not be as high.210
3.4 Method for Data Analysis 
After performing the interviews and collecting the empirical information, the authors began
the project of analysing the data. With the qualitative analysis the data is transformed into 
findings211. The main challenge in the analysis lies in making sense of the massive amounts of 
information212. Since the qualitative approach is unique for every study, the analytical 
approach will also be unique213.  
When analysing, the data is categorised in attempt to find patterns of convergence and 
divergence. According to Patton, categories should be judged by to criteria, these are; internal 
homogeneity and external heterogeneity. Internal homogeneity regards to which extent the 
data merge, while external heterogeneity concerns the differences between the data.214
The study intends to analyse the collected data from different aspects. The authors wished to 
compare the answers between the banks based on their differing organisational structure. The 
intent was to categorise the answers of the respondents and structure patterns of convergence 
and divergence. After breaking down the results down into categories, the categories were 
analysed based on the organisational structure of the banks. Further, an attempt is made to 
validate the results of this study by making use of the academic articles from the second 
chapter. It is important to make comparisons, why the empiric data was compared with 
studies closely linked to this subject. The aim was to explain the results by making use of 
earlier studies and literature.215
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3.5 Alternative Research Approach 
The study was conducted by gathering information through interviews. However, there are 
always alternative methods of conducting a study. One alternative is direct observation of the 
respondent’s behaviour. The observation can be made in different ways. Either, the observer 
can sit behind a one way mirror and not be seen, or the observer can participate and follow the 
respondent during a work day. This approach is suitable for answering questions such as 
“what does a chef executive officer do?” or in this case “how do the bank practically apply the 
Basel II Framework?” 216 However, since the intent was to compare the practical application 
of Basel II in two banks of different organisational structure. The approach of observation 
would be too time consuming. Also, observations would not enable the authors to gather 
information on the respondents’ opinions on varying aspects of the framework wherefore 
interviews were deemed to be more suitable. Considering the types of questions used in this 
study and the limited time horizon, observation was never an option. Further, an observation 
is more fitting when studying the respondent’s performance and actions217. 
In addition to observations questionnaires could have been used. These are standardised forms 
where every respondent answers the same questions. 218 Most of the time options to answer 
are set in advance, why you do not get any in-deep answers from your respondents. This 
approach presupposes that the researcher has enough knowledge in advance.219 When using 
questionnaires a larger group of respondents can be reached in a smaller amount of time, than 
if interviews are used. Further, this larger independent selection makes it possible to draw 
general conclusions. However, the intent was not to reach a large group of respondents. 
Instead the authors wanted to focus on a smaller group of respondents where more open-
ended questions could be asked. The authors wanted the possibility to reach deeper in the 
replies and not just get more limited answers. Further, the authors were only interested in
respondent from two specific banks, why a questionnaire or survey with a large selection of 
respondents was not optimal for the study. The intent was never to draw any general 
conclusions and as such interviews were deemed to be more appropriate.
A third option would be to make a case-study. In a case study focus is put on researching a 
single unit. This unit can either regard specific persons or a specific organisation, as in this
case, one single bank.220 This was neither an alternative as the intent was to study if there are
any variations in the application between banks of different organisational structure. 
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3.6 Chapter Summary
To collect the information required for this study a qualitative approach was used. This 
approach was the most appropriate to illustrate the focus question since the intent was to 
examine how the Basel II framework was practically applied in banks of different 
organisational structure, and also to give light as to their opinions of the framework. 
Furthermore an inductive approach has been used, supporting the empiric results with existing 
literature. In line with the phenomenological approach the study has examined a certain 
phenomenon. The authors have conducted in-depth interviews with people who have come in 
direct contact with the phenomenon, Basel II. Furthermore the aim has been to create new 
theory through the methods proposed by grounded theory. This method aims to give the 
researcher the possibility of seeing alternate meanings of a phenomenon why the authors have 
gathered empirical data from the real world. The primary data sources for this study are a 
number of interviews conducted with two Swedish banks and the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority. The aim was to conduct all of the interviews face-to-face but in cases 
where this was not possible the respondents were interviewed over the phone. The secondary 
data is gathered form other authors who have interpreted similar or related situations or 
events. Moreover, regarding the sample the authors have chosen to interview those who are 
well-informed in our area of research. This has been done in order to learn about central 
issues concerning Basel II that are important to the study. Further, the study needs to be 
reliable. With this in mind, and in order to sustain an open approach the authors had the same 
basic questions for all interviews, but were open to further deepen the discussion depending 
on the respondents’ answers. Regarding the validity of the study it is important that it 
measures what it is intended to measure. Hence, when choosing respondents the authors have 
interviewed those with specialist knowledge about Basel II. When all data was collected it 
was analysed by trying to find patterns of convergence and divergence. Even though this 
study was conducted by making use of interviews an there were options, but they were not 
deemed to be suitable in this case.
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4. Current Discussion
The following chapter will take up the more current discussion about Basel II in order to
further deepen the reader’s understanding. The chapter will start with a brief history of the 
Basel II Framework and its intent. Thereafter, it will take up the discussion of the 
framework’s developments and enhancements. Finally, the chapter will reveal opinions of the 
framework, from both before and after the financial crisis.  
4.1 Brief History of the Basel Committee and its Framework
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established in 1974 by central bank
Governors. The members of the Committee come from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
the United States.221
The Committee is no international authority; instead its goal is to develop broad standards 
which are recommended to legal authorities. These, in turn, may choose if they want to 
implement the standards or not. The Committee works towards harmonisation of banking 
approaches, without setting details in member countries' supervisory techniques.222
The Committee introduced a capital measurement system in 1988. This is referred to as the 
Basel Capital Accord. The aim of this system was to create a framework regarding a 
minimum capital requirement; this minimum level was set to eight percentages.223
Since 1988, the framework has reach out to the Committee’s member nations as well as other 
countries with international active banks. It was in 1999 as the Committee laid out a proposal 
for a revised Capital Adequacy Framework, which consisted of three pillars, where the first 
one aimed to improve to rules set out in the 1988’s Basel Capital Accord, and regarded a 
sufficient capital base.224
The proposal was followed by a consultative process with all the member countries and 
supervisory authorities. The Committee released further proposals for consultation in 2001 
and 2003. All these efforts led to important improvements to the original proposal and the 
present version is agreed by all member states.225
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4.2 Basel II – the revised framework
It was in June 2004 as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, a Revised 
Framework, more known as Basel II.226 It became available for implementation in the year-
end of 2007227. 
The Basel II Framework is a result of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisions’ work on 
securing “international convergence on revisions to supervisory regulations governing the 
capital adequacy of internationally active banks”.228 An essential part of the new and 
improved framework is the use of banks’ internal risk measurements as inputs when 
calculating the capital base229.  
In May 2006 it was agreed that national financial supervisory authorities shall monitor the 
capital requirements during the implementation of Basel II and the Committee will monitor 
national progress230. Each supervisor should control and ensure that the banks’ systems give 
rise to a sufficient capital base. The supervisors are expected to ensure compliance with the 
minimum capital requirements.231
Basel II aims to increase financial stability.232 The intent of the framework is to strengthen the 
international banking system with focus on keeping an adequate capital base. Further, banks 
and other parties have welcomed the concept of the three pillars; regarding minimum capital 
requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. It is on these three pillars as the 
improved framework is based, and it is developed to reach more risk-sensitive capital 
requirements. The Committee has held on to the elements of 1988 capital requirements, 
regarding a minimum capital requirement of eight percentages of their risk-weighted assets.233
The new framework provides flexibility for banks when choosing the appropriate approach 
for calculating the capital base. The Committee intends to monitor the application of the Basel 
II Framework to achieve consistency in the application.234
It is important to note that the new framework is designed to set the minimum required capital 
for internationally active banks, why national authorities are allowed to raise the level of 
sufficient capital. Furthermore, the national authorities are free to complement the measures 
for calculating the capital base.235
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As mentioned, the framework is based on three pillars, where the first one concerns the 
minimum capital base. This must be complemented by the second pillar, concerning 
supervisory review, and the third pillar, regarding market discipline. Every pillar is needed to 
ensure the efficiency of the other two.236
According to the Committee it is important to repeat the objectives on a regulatory basis and 
overlook the minimum level of capital required. The objectives are set up to broadly maintain 
the aggregate level of requirements, why it provides incentives to implement a more advanced 
approach regarding the calculation of the capital base.237
4.3 Cooperation and Continuous Development
The new framework is designed to be more forward-looking with regard to the supervision of 
the required capital and it has the possibility to evolve over time. In addition to this, the 
framework keeps up with the development of the market. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision takes concerns towards changes by rework the framework when it is needed.238
Further, the Committee on European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has been analysing a 
number of questions regarding the implementation of Basel II239. The CEBS gives advice to 
the European Commission on banking policy issues and has encouraged cooperation and 
convergence of supervisory practices, as well as a common implementation and consistent 
application.240
To be able to reach a larger group of countries, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
has encouraged cooperation between its members and other supervisory authorities. The 
secretariat of the Committee is supplied by the Bank for International Settlements in Basel.241   
The Committee intends to continuously keep a dialogue with the banking industry. Many of 
these banking organisations have put a lot of effort into developing models that concerns the 
credit risk. These models are used by banks in “quantifying, aggregating and managing credit 
risk across geographic and product lines” and the Committee considers it important to keep a 
dialogue concerning the performance and comparability of these measures.242
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4.4 Enhancements to the Basel II Capital Framework
A publication from January 2009 regards the fact that the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has taken actions towards strengthening the Basel II framework.  The objective of 
these enhancements regards “the regulation and supervision of internationally active banks in 
light of weaknesses revealed by the financial markets crisis”. Nout Wellink, Chairman of the 
Basel Committee and President of the Netherlands Bank said;243
"the proposed enhancements will help ensure that the risks inherent in 
banks' portfolios related to trading activities, securitisations and 
exposures to off-balance sheet vehicles are better reflected in minimum 
capital requirements, risk management practices and accompanying 
disclosures to the public."244
In addition, the Committee is proposing standards to encourage a more accurate supervision 
and risk management of risk concentrations, off-balance sheet exposures, securitisations and 
related reputation risks.245 These changes are part of a broader work programme that the 
Committee published in its 20 November 2008 press release. This programme aims to 
strengthen capital adequacy, risk management and supervision.246 According to Wellink, the 
Committee indents to implement the program in a way that increases the financial confidence 
and that avoids worsening current market conditions.247
4.5 Basel II – prior to application
One of the reasons for the developments towards Basel II has been the need of synchronising 
bank regulations with the operations of banks abiding by those regulations. This 
synchronisation is needed due to the costs for banks of having double systems which is 
needed if the regulations are too standardised and not applicable to the banks’ practical 
work.248
In accordance with Basel II it is the role of the Board of a bank to supervise and ensure that 
the bank follows the risk- and capital strategies that are set out by the board. Furthermore the 
Board must decide on methods of risk management and risk control and ensure that these are 
used throughout the bank. The Chief Executive Officer of the bank, as well as other senior 
officers must thereafter ensure that the systems set out by the Board are used in the daily 
activities of the group. The roles of the Board and other senior officers are important in order 
to ensure certain knowledge about the degree of risk that the bank is subject to, and in order to 
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avoid situations where executive officers have too large opportunities to act independently of 
an ignorant board, subjecting to bank to risk.249
The method for supervision of banks in accordance with the Basel II Framework is based on 
three parts. First, the banks have been given greater responsibility for their own internal 
controls. Secondly the supervisory authorities have greater powers to ensure that banks follow 
not only the letter of the law but also the spirit of the law when building strong systems of 
leadership and operating in accordance with the framework. Furthermore, the banks are 
subject to supervision by external parties that have been given larger opportunities to analyse 
the banks. The aim of the supervision that has been set out is to ensure that each bank is 
frequently analysed by a number of parties.250
Prior to its application the Basel II Framework has been discussed for a number of reasons. 
One of these is the pro-cyclical nature that results when Basel II is applied in real life. This 
results from rising capital requirements in times of recession, causing banks not to lend 
money when it is needed. On the other hand, excessive lending may be seen in times of an 
upswing and as a result, changes in economic situations are amplified.251
Another issue that was raised prior to the application of the Basel II Framework was the risk 
that banks would start behaving in a too similar manner when choosing how to adapt to and 
work with Basel II. The concerns centred on the issue that if the risk management systems of 
banks become all too similar, changes in economic situations would be amplified and there 
would also be a greater risk for disturbances in the system. If banks were to have similar 
approaches to risk management there is a risk that these would all produce incorrect and 
misleading risk measurements, posing a threat to the banks.252
4.6 De Larosière Report
The De Larosière Report has looked at the causes to the ongoing financial crisis in order to 
determine how best to prevent such crises in the future.253 One of the core causes to the 
ongoing financial crisis was the abundance of liquidity and low interest rates to be found in 
financial markets. This caused the participants of the financial markets to take greater risks, 
resulting in today’s crisis.254
The question is now, what authorities can do in order to decrease the risks of bubbles as 
compared to the current approach of intervening after the bubbles have burst. In order to 
achieve such behaviour it is important that authorities communicate any concerns about 
market sustainability in terms of increases in asset prices and also that they strive for more 
objective risk evaluations. Furthermore, authorities should develop and implement monetary 
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policies with the aim of overlooking monetary and credit developments, not only consumer 
prices. The De Larosière Report suggests that authorities should aim at using a number of 
regulatory tools for counter-cyclical objectives.255 The suggested regulatory tools are;
“introducing dynamic provisioning or counter-cyclical reserves on banks in 
‘good times’ to limit credit expansion and so to alleviate pro-cyclicality effects in 
the ‘bad times’; making rules on loans to value more restrictive; modifying tax 
rules that excessively stimulate the demand for assets.”256
The Report states that these tools were not sufficiently used by authorities prior to the ongoing 
crisis. Furthermore there is a need for greater communication and cooperation between 
monetary and regulatory authorities in order to determine how best to achieve a stable macro-
economic framework, to increase the oversight of financial institutions.257
The De Larosière Report argues that Basel II is not to be seen as a major cause of the financial 
crisis. The reason is that Basel II only came into force on 1 January 2008 and will not be 
enforced in the U.S. until 1 April 2010. The Basel II Framework contains a number of 
improvements that to a certain extent could have helped prevent the crisis. However, it was 
enforced too late for this to be possible.258
The De Larosière Report is also critical to Basel II stating that it is in need of review. A 
reason for this is that Basel II put too much faith in the ability of financial institutions to 
handle important risks, and also underestimated these risks. Furthermore the belief of Basel II 
that the use of securitisation could spread risks could transfer risk away from the financial 
institutions has been proven incorrect. In addition to this, the Report claims that in preparing 
Basel II too much emphasis has been put on recent economic data from periods of good 
liquidity.259
The De Larosière Report states that liquidity is an issue that has not received enough attention 
from supervisors, as it is an important matter both for individual firms but also for the 
regulatory system. Furthermore, the Report disapproves of the Basel II Framework’s reliance 
upon the grades of credit rating agencies. The ratings become an issue if they cause the user to 
rely too heavily on the rating agencies, thus not seeing the need for using their own judgement 
in making investment decisions. The ratings should only be relied on in financial markets if 
they are performed by competent firms who work with integrity.260
Another issue that has come to light is that banks have used internal risk models created by 
the use of too short statistical horizons and therefore they have not functioned properly in the 
crisis period that the financial markets are currently enduring. Furthermore, there is a lack of 
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understanding of risk and risk models in financial institutions. The De Larosière report argues 
that there is a need for greater understanding of the natures and extents of risks taken.261
The De Larosière Report presents a number of areas of improvement for the Basel II 
Framework. The first is that there should be increased minimum requirements of high quality 
capital in banks. The second area of improvement concerns the pro-cyclical impacts of Basel 
II. This nature has emerged from the risk-sensitive capital requirements and the mark-to-
market principle used in market conditions as those of today. These rules have augmented the 
movements in market trends.262
Moreover, there is a need for greater focus on the management of liquidity risk as to ensure 
that any increases in risks are consistent with the assets; their nature and holding horizons by 
the bank. Also the rules on off-balance sheet vehicles should be stricter and there is also a 
need to guarantee greater transparency.263
4.7 Chapter Summary 
The chapter starts of with a brief history of the Basel Committee and its framework, Basel II,
stating that the intent with the framework is to strengthen the international banking system 
with focus on keeping an adequate capital base. Further it explained that Basel II is a revised 
framework and that it was in June 2004 that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
published the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, a 
Revised Framework, more commonly known as Basel II. The framework is designed to set 
the minimum required capital for internationally active banks. The chapter further stated that 
the Committee considers the changing economic environment and as such develops the 
framework when it is needed. This is exemplified in a publication from January 2009 
regarding the fact that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has taken actions 
towards strengthening the Basel II framework. In prior to the application of the framework, it 
is the roles of the Board and other senior officers which are important in order to ensure 
certain knowledge about the degree of risk that the bank is subject to. The Basel II Framework 
has been discussed for a number of reasons. One of these is the pro-cyclical nature that results 
from the framework. This results from rising capital requirements in times of recession, and
banks not lending money when it is needed. The De Larosière Report has looked at the causes 
to the ongoing financial crisis in order to determine how best to prevent such crises in the 
future. According to the report, it is important that authorities communicate any concerns 
about market sustainability in terms of increases in asset prices and also that they strive for 
more objective risk evaluations. However, the De Larosière Report argues that Basel II is not 
to be seen as a major cause of the financial crisis. The reason is that Basel II only came into 
force on 1 January 2008 and will not be enforced in the U.S. until 1 April 2010. Further, the 
report presents a number of areas of improvement for the Basel II Framework. The first is that 
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there should be increased minimum requirements of high quality capital in banks. The second 
area of improvement concerns the pro-cyclical impacts of Basel II.
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5. Interviews
This chapter will reveal the empiric results based on the answers of three respondents from 
each studied bank as well as the replies from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. In 
order to achieve a complete analysis, the chapter will also present certain aspects of both 
banks’ reports on capital adequacy and risk management from 2008. The conclusions are 
based on the respondents’ answers to questions regarding the Basel II framework, its 
implementation, pros and cons and compliance with the framework and the reports on capital 
adequacy and risk management. We further aim to compare the empiric results and our 
secondary data. Finally, the chapter ends with a summarising chart.
5.1 Bank A – Introduction and Risk Management
The first bank to be chosen to be examined for this study has been called Bank A. This is a 
decentralised organisation where every office carries the responsibility for possible credit 
losses. However, credit limits are agreed upon in different levels in the organisation 
depending on the size of the credit limit. Hence, the offices deal with the problems of clients 
failing to pay back yet are supported by headquarters.264
Bank A has a clear responsibility distribution where every business unit carries the 
responsibility for their business and risks. According to the bank, the person who knows the 
customer best has the most accurate information to evaluate the risk taken. Since every office 
is a profit centre there are strong incentives for cautious risk taking. Each person is 
responsible for the risk that they submit the organisation to, but there is also a local control of 
risk within different business areas. This is controlled to ensure that the risk taken is not too 
high.265
In Bank A, a central credit department prepares decisions taken by the board or its credit 
committee. The central credit department makes sure that the credit decisions of the 
organisation are made in uniformity and in line with the decisions made by the board. Further, 
the central credit department supports the credit organisation as a whole.266
The capital level required in order to ensure the bank’s survival is determined with 
consideration to what is required by law as well as stress tests and economic capital. Further, 
Bank A’s Central Finance Department has the responsibility that the organisation holds a 
satisfying liquidity. The liquidity situation is reported daily to the CFO and on a regular basis
to executive director and the board.267    
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Bank A aims to be a relation-bank and the offices keep regular contact with the customer. 
This provides a deeper understanding of and more updated information about the customer. 
The bank is strongly focused on building long-term relations with good customers with high 
credibility.268
Through the internal risk measuring system the bank’s credit risk is measured in a, for the 
bank, reliable and uniform way. The classification of risk is built on the bank’s internal rating, 
which in turn is based on the customer’s possibility to pay back. Hence, when the bank 
evaluates a customer’s credit risk they look at the possibility to pay back. According to Bank 
A, a weak possibility to pay back can never be compensated with good security. However, a 
safety can reduce the loss of the bank if the customer does not fulfil his or her obligations.269
To quantify the bank’s credit risk a probability of the risk of customers defaulting is used. 
This is called probability of default (PD). Furthermore, other measures are used such as the 
size of the banks exposure in case of malfunction called exposure at default (EAD) and the 
share of the exposure that the bank losses in case of malfunction called loss given default
(LGD).270
Bank A annually oversees their risk classification system. This system is partly focused on the 
internal rating, which aims for the systems to be used in a consistent, high-quality and 
purposive way, and partly on statistical models which quantifies satisfactory risk. In order to 
handle situations where the internal rating does not work, Bank A makes use of model 
adjustments, changed instructions for rating etc. The reports of validations are sent to the 
board of Bank A and are reviewed by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority.271
Historically Bank A has had a well functioning risk management. This is, among other 
factors, shown in the fact that Bank A has had lower credit losses than its competitors. The 
increased sensitivity concerning the capital requirement in regard to the Basel II Framework 
has strengthened the focus of the bank’s risk management.272
5.2 Bank B – Introduction and Risk Management
The second bank in the study has been called Bank B. Bank B has a centralised organisational 
structure.
In their 2008 report on capital adequacy and risk management Bank B states that a key to 
profitability lies in the bank’s own abilities in the evaluation, management and pricing of 
risks. At the same time the bank must take care to sustain a certain level of capitalisation for 
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any potential unforeseen occurrences in the bank. In order to maintain a certain degree of 
financial stability the bank early on makes sure to identify, monitor and manage any issues 
related to risk and capital.273
The 2008 report of Bank B further states that the Board of Directors is responsible for 
ensuring internal controls and the bank’s risk. Thus it lies upon the board to monitor risk 
exposure and also to establish policies on capital and risk for the bank. In addition to the 
policies set out by the Board of Directors, the bank has a risk control function that issues 
further instructions. Furthermore Bank B has a committee that is assigned the task of 
identifying, defining, measuring, and monitoring risks as set out by both external and internal 
regulation. 274
The overall responsibility for ensuring that risk management is complete, in accordance with 
both the policies and intentions of the Board, lies upon the President and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the bank. The President and CEO also has the task of informing the Board 
of any essential risk information.275
Ensuring the practical application of the Board’s intentions of risk management and control 
within Bank B is the task of two committees working with credit and assets and liabilities. 
The task entails the acceptance of policies for implementation of risk management and control 
and how this is to be managed, controlled and evaluated. The committee working with assets 
and liabilities handles the overall risk level of Bank B including its divisions. Furthermore the
committee has decisive powers in areas such as methods for measuring risk, limitations to risk 
and capital management. The committee working with control of risk is the body assigned the 
task of monitoring credit, market, operational and liquidity risk. Risk management on a daily 
basis within the bank is the responsibility of its divisions, treasury and support functions. The 
daily risk management is assisted by risk organisations and risk managers.276  
The issue of capital is a centrally regulated issue within Bank B. In order to guard the bank 
against sharp declines in the macro-economic environment, stress-tests are used in order to 
asses an extra safety margin in addition to the requirements from capital models. The bank 
uses an economic capital framework largely based on Basel II rules on capital adequacy and it 
is enhanced to create a higher sensitivity to risk in capital assessment processes, to asses the 
need of capital. The essence of the framework is that the greater the risk, a larger risk buffer is 
needed.277
When credit decisions within Bank B are made consideration is given to the creditworthiness 
of the potential client and also to the type of credit arrangement that is in question. The 
client’s current and future financial situation is considered as well as any form of covenants or 
collateral that may be in question.278
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When considering the credit portfolio of Bank B emphasis is put on determining any 
concentrations of risk in geographical areas, industry sectors and any large names. Such large
names encompass both risk exposures but also include large names that issue collateral or 
guaranties and credit derivatives. Collateral values that are non-retail are based on an 
estimation of their market values, estimations which are reviewed annually. 279
When granting credit for mortgages and other retail exposures Bank B uses a method for 
scoring that depends on the business that is pursued and the criteria for scoring differ between 
portfolios and countries. To classify credit exposures that are non-retail Bank B uses internal 
risk classes based on the risk of default on payment obligations. These risk classifications are 
used when determining limits on credit as well as issues related to the monitoring, managing 
and reporting of the credit portfolio.280
The risk rating system and its performance is reviewed on a regular basis as to assure that the 
system for credit risk class assignment is functioning satisfactorily and that it is used as set 
out in internal rules and instructions. The review of the performance of the credit risk system 
is completed by staff independent of those who assign risk class to clients.281
When looking at the credit details Bank B uses the same risk classes, PD scale and approach 
to rating for all clients. However some adjustments may be made in relation to the industry in 
which the client is active. The system of risk class assignment used in Bank B encompasses 
both business risk and financial risk and the circumstances of the client are considered. The 
client is further assessed in relation to financial ratios and peer group comparison. Clients in 
risk classes are reviewed at least annually and those in higher risk classes, high-risk 
exposures, are reviewed more frequently in attempt to identify problems early and thereby 
identify solutions. Retail exposures are assigned to pools of probability of default on the basis 
of the score they receive when being judged on, among other things, payment behaviour. Any 
new risk exposures that have no earlier history in the bank receive a score from an external 
vendor. Bank B uses probability of default estimates reflecting the average default frequency 
for a risk class over a business cycle. The values of probability of default are based on 
historical statistics of defaults within the bank of over a period of at least one business cycle. 
In cases when internal data has not been sufficient the bank has chosen to complement with 
external data.282
5.3 The Implementation of Basel II
5.3.1 Organisational Structure of Bank A and Bank B
The regulation for banks, the Basel II Framework, has been implemented in Sweden since 
2007. Banks in Sweden, a country which by tradition has had a decentralised banking 
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culture283, have therefore had to adopt to a framework which has been argued to be more 
suited for centralised management284. 
The banks studied in line with this thesis were chosen on the basis of their organisational 
structure. Bank A was chosen for its decentralised structure and Bank B was chosen for being 
centralised. However, the respondents often described the banks as showing traces of both 
centralisation and decentralisation. Respondents from Bank A all stated that the bank was 
decentralised. However, when presenting how the bank worked with risk management and 
credit policies it became clear that the handling of these issues was a more centralised matter. 
For example the choice credit policy was a centralised decision however; decisions on 
granting credit were taken locally in different offices.285 However, larger credits may be 
decided upon higher up in the organisation286. Also, decisions concerning Basel II were taken 
centrally287. On the other hand, the respondents of Bank B did not want to describe 
themselves as fully centralised. Instead they described how certain areas of the bank were 
centralised while other areas were more decentralised. For example risk management was a 
centralised issue288. Also, concerning credit grants in Bank B, decisions were taken at several 
levels, for example if the matter concerned a very large credit of several million Swedish 
crowns, then the credit decision would be taken centrally.289
5.3.2 Risk Quantification and the Transition to Basel II
Mikes found two differing attitudes to risk quantification in the banks that she studied, where 
one of the banks was more positive to this than the other290. Concerning the process of 
implementing Basel II in Bank A and Bank B differing attitudes towards risk quantification 
could also be seen. 
The respondents of the decentralised Bank A describe how they initially found it difficult to 
accept the need of quantitative material and studies that needed to be included in the 
applications to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. One respondent stated: 
“We describe ourselves as a relation bank and we have not been impressed 
by quantitative analysis.”291
The deputy credit manager from Bank A says that prior to the adoption of Basel II the 
procedures for handling of information in Bank A were less formalised. There was a lot of 
paperwork but the bank had no routines in place to gather the information into databases as is 
done according to Basel II. An employee within credit risk management at Bank A focused on 
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describing the importance of implementing Basel II in accordance with the organisational 
culture of the bank. He said that Bank A felt that employees at local offices could better 
determine the risk of their client, and as such they wanted to enable them to do this as well as 
possible while still abiding by the regulations of Basel II.
Compared to Bank A, respondents at Bank B were more positive to the implementation of 
Basel II. A credit manager at Bank B felt that the implementation process had gone smoothly. 
However, a risk coordinator within risk management said that to start with, in 2002-2003, it 
was not easy to understand the final intent of the framework. The same respondent also 
believed that the centralised organisational structure of the bank was well suited for the 
implementation of Basel II. Bank B does not mention any difficulties with the quantitative 
analysis implied by Basel II. They also do not offer any negative opinions as to the use of 
such quantitative analysis. 
The evidence presented above points towards that Bank A has been less positive to the 
quantitative dynamics that come with the implementation of Basel II. This may be explained 
by their decentralised structure and the fact that they describe themselves as a bank 
emphasising client relationships. In such an organisational culture where client relations are 
important and the head office wants to delegate a lot of the decision making power to local 
offices, there is bound to be a more negative attitude to the quantitative nature of the Basel II 
Framework and the requirements on implementation of the framework. On the other hand 
Bank B with its more centralised structure gives a more positive view of the transfer to Basel 
II and the quantitative analysis that came with this. A probable reason for this could be that 
centralised organisational structures have higher power distance than decentralised 
organisations292. The Basel II framework, by greater emphasis on numbers and quantitative 
analysis, contributes to greater uniformity within the organisation293. This in turn leads to 
more concentration of power to the organisation’s headquarters294. As such the quantitative 
nature of Basel II is more in line with the centralised structure of Bank B and thus there may 
be fewer objections to this quantitative nature within the organisation.
5.3.3 Application of Basel II in Bank A and Bank B Today
Bank A has an organisational structure comprising a small central organisation, a regional 
organisation and local offices. The central organisation is in charge of the formal work with 
Basel II and as such it has the task of interpreting the regulation and developing the models 
required by Basel II and also the internal models for how the organisation is to work with 
Basel II. Furthermore the central organisation prepares the ground work and discusses the 
outlines of instructions for the rest of the organisation.295
The regional organisations are important to the implementation of Basel II and comprise six 
regional offices. They are responsible for having a certain level of expertise within the area 
and they are responsible for the education of all involved personnel within the region. 
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Concerning the daily implementation, this task is performed by the local offices and the 
regional organisation.296 However, it lies within the responsibilities of the regional 
organisation to ensure that Basel II is in fact implemented in the local offices.297
Bank A believes that the local offices are best suited to judge the risk of a client. This belief 
has been a central issue when deciding on the implementation of Basel II. As such, Bank A 
has focused on creating support functions to aid the credit staff of local offices in their 
judgment of a client’s risk.298 These functions take the form of central or regional support as 
well as education and the possibility to contact specialists in case of need.299 In the transfer to 
Basel II The bank provided educational programs for all (credit) managers and the office 
managers have made sure that the information has been passed on to employees at local 
offices.300
In Bank B, work on Basel II and its implementation began in 2002-2003301, before the final 
decision on Basel II was made302. Work on Basel II and its implementation in the bank is 
directed and controlled centrally.303 The organisation in itself comprises a central office and 
three regional offices and local offices.304  It is the responsibility of the central organisation to 
develop the models for risk management that are used within the organisation as required by 
the Basel II Framework.305
Concerning issues of credit there are different decision levels within the bank. These levels 
are based on the size of the credit. Smaller credits are granted by local offices and the larger 
the credit the higher up in the organisation the decision is taken, first regionally and thereafter 
centrally.306 In smaller offices, up to 95% of all credit decisions can be of such a size that they 
can be decided upon within the local office. Smaller offices also seldom handle such large 
credits that need to be taken to the central organisation for approval.307
5.3.4 Approaches to Risk Management and Calculative Cultures
When studying ERM in practise Mikes found two variations in the practical application of the 
risk model based on either shareholder value (the numeric approach) or risk-based internal 
control mechanisms (the holistic approach).308 Parallels can be drawn between these 
approaches to ERM and the practical application of Basel II in Bank A and Bank B. 
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A deputy credit manager at Bank A said that traditionally Bank A has been a bank based upon 
client relationships and they have not been impressed by the use of quantitative analysis. The 
respondent continues by explaining that in the initial phases of the adoption of Basel II, the 
bank had a difficult time coming to terms with the amount of quantitative material and studies 
that were a necessary part of the adoption and application process. He also explained that 
prior to Basel II the work in local offices was less formalised, there was a lot of paperwork, 
yet this information did not have to be transferred into large databases such as those now 
required due to Basel II. The unwillingness to use quantitative analysis and the historical lack 
of more formalised databases leads the authors to believe that initially and prior to the 
implementation of Basel II Bank A had a holistic approach to risk management.
An employee within credit risk management explained that with the adoption of Basel II Bank 
A has developed templates which all offices must use when evaluating the risk of any client.
Further no office may depart from the model that has been set out as the whole organisation 
must follow the same credit policy and capital adequacy regulations. As such all offices rate 
clients according to the same templates. A private market manager said that Basel II resulted 
in the use of a greater number of parameters which are to be considered when evaluating 
existing and potential clients. Further the risk classifications into which clients can be 
categorised have increased in number, from four to one hundred. Bank A has also increased 
its supervision of the risk evaluations that local offices complete. Any deviations from 
projected risk evaluations of clients are analysed and added to statistical databases. One 
respondent said:
“We collect lists of all the loans that offices have which are not fulfilled 
properly by the client… These are collected and summed up and are in turn 
checked up upon by Finansinspektionen [Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority] or another authority.”309
The deputy credit manager that was interviewed presented the view that one of the results of 
Basel II was that there would be an increase in documentation and that this documentation 
would be followed up to a greater extent than before.
So far the evidence above points towards the conclusion that Basel II has resulted in an 
increased numerical approach to risk management within Bank A. However, Bank A still 
shows traces of the initially more holistic approach to risk management. 
One of the respondents holds to the idea that the bank still mainly uses quantitative analysis as 
a complementary method of evaluating risk in clients. The level of detail required as a result 
of the implementation of Basel II was viewed negatively. A respondent said that as a result of 
Basel II the local offices must analyse a lot of variables for every credit risk evaluation, no 
matter what the size of the credit. The bank has different parameters for evaluating for 
example companies and individual persons, however, within these classifications there is no 
difference in parameters which are reviewed.
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More evidence that the holistic approach still exists in Bank A is the general attitude to the 
understanding of the regulation within the bank. When discussing how well the regulation is 
observed within all areas of the bank the respondents have described the use of random 
testing. However they point out that in their opinion education and an understanding of the 
regulation is more important. Bank A puts a lot of emphasis into the continuous updating of 
the employees on Basel II and how it affects their work. They argue that it is of great 
importance that all employees understand the importance of not having bad clients and that 
this is best achieved through continuous education and updates. We believe that a possible 
explanation for this behaviour is that Bank A believes that the employees in local offices best 
judge the risk in their clients and that they therefore need this information. 
The conclusion that can be reached is that initially Bank A had a very holistic approach to risk 
management. However, with the move towards Basel II the bank has had to accept a greater 
amount of risk quantification, in the form of increased follow-ups of compliance with the 
models as well as random tests and a greater of number of parameters when evaluating 
clients. However, despite this increase in quantitative material we still see the holistic culture 
of the organisation shining through. This takes the form of the attitude towards education and 
the dislike of the amount of quantitative parameters. 
A risk coordinator within risk management at Bank B said that when Basel II was first 
introduced this required a new way of thinking about pricing and risk. However, Bank B 
seems to have adopted Basel II with less unwillingness than in Bank A. The risk coordinator 
from Bank B describes how they already in 2006 implemented a tool for better registering 
issues related to risk within the bank. A credit manager from Bank B said that in order to 
study how well risk evaluations of clients correspond with reality Bank B has a department 
focusing on studying all the credit granting documents of local offices to see if the evaluations 
turned out to be and still are correct. In addition to this, the risk coordinator within Bank B 
described how Bank B follow up compliance with the risk calculation templates to ensure that 
they are used and they also do random tests of risk evaluations and how these are done. 
Furthermore Bank B has a system that identifies where risk evaluations have been faulty. The 
system has been put in place in order to enable improvements in risk evaluation for the future. 
An office manager from a smaller office commented that the bank’s procedures of following 
up and examining the use of the models created as a result of Basel II were numerous. The 
respondent also commented that it was her job to monitor this within the office. Her job was 
monitored by another who was monitored by another and so on. She further commented that 
within the organisation there was a lot of supervision to ensure compliance with the internal 
models and that deviation from the models was not easily accepted. The risk coordinator and 
the credit manager of Bank B have said that in order to evaluate the performance of the 
system Bank B focuses on the use of calculations.
The evidence above points towards that Bank B has a more numeric approach to risk 
management. The early implementation of a tool for registering issues related to risk suggests 
that the numeric approach to risk management to some degree existed within the organisation 
already prior to the formal implementation of Basel II. This system shows that the bank early 
on had the intent of further improving its risk managing techniques. Since the implementation 
of Basel II we can see that Bank B has not abandoned this numeric approach. In the current 
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application of the framework Bank B makes use of many techniques to follow up and improve 
the systems used in the bank. These techniques identify if the systems are functioning 
adequately or if and how they can be improved. This evidence further suggests that Bank B 
has a more numeric approach to risk management but the study has also found more traces of 
the numeric approach. 
Education about Basel II in Bank B is not a continuous matter. When Basel II was first
implemented in the organisation the employees were educated in the new programs for 
calculating risk and similar issues. The education required that each employee take part in one 
education opportunity. For education purposes Bank B made use of e-learning which meant 
that the employees took part in education through their computers. A number of months after 
the education opportunity all employees who had taken part in the education had to take a test 
to see how well they remembered what they had been taught. The purpose of the test was also 
to evaluate the education scheme. Once employees had completed there education no further 
education was organised.310 Once again we can see how Bank B has a tendency towards the 
numeric approach to risk management. The tests of the education program were used in order 
to ascertain their effectiveness, hence if they created any value for the organisation. 
The conclusion that can be drawn about risk management in Bank B is that prior to the 
implementation of Basel II the bank already showed traces of a numeric approach to risk 
management. With the introduction of Basel II the bank has implemented the requirements in 
line with this numeric approach, submitting all levels of the bank to studies of compliance in 
order to see if the system is functioning and if or how it can be improved. Further evidence of 
the bank’s numeric approach can be seen in the way they have chosen to educate and evaluate 
knowledge of the framework within the bank, making use of tests in order to evaluate this. 
The introduction of new control systems can prove to have a more or less difficult time 
gaining acceptance from the intended users. Mikes made use of the concept of calculative 
cultures in order to classify different attitudes of the intended users; calculative idealism and 
calculative pragmatism.311 Such a classification is in order in our study of Basel II as well.
Bank A has historically been a bank based on relationships with clients, where quantitative 
analysis has not been in wide use. However, with the introduction of Basel II, the need to 
introduce such analysis has increased. The respondents have said that since the 
implementation of Basel II the bank has increased documentation of risk evaluation practices. 
The follow-up of such evaluations has also increased. Basel II has also resulted in a greater 
number of parameters on which to base credit evaluations. The employees of the bank are of 
the opinion that these parameters give a better and more fair evaluation than what was done 
before. However the bank still includes client relationships in its evaluations of clients. This 
leads us to the conclusion that Bank A probable had a more calculative pragmatic approach to 
risk management prior to Basel II. However, with the implementation of Basel II, the bank 
may be moving in a direction towards a more calculative idealistic approach.
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Based partly on the way in which Bank B continuously throughout different areas of the bank 
make use of quantifiable evaluations the conclusion can be drawn that the bank has a 
calculative idealistic approach. Further evidence of the calculative idealistic approach is given 
as the bank has installed systems for evaluation of risk evaluations in order to improve these 
for the future. Furthermore, throughout the interviews conducted for this study no one has 
mentioned any negative aspects of the use the bank’s risk management techniques. The lack 
of critique of what can be considered an extended use of quantitative evaluations suggests that 
the general attitude towards this within Bank B is positive. Furthermore the risk coordinator 
and credit manager within Bank B have said that the bank mainly seeks to judge compliance
by making use of calculations adding to the reasons suggesting that Bank B has a more 
calculative idealistic approach to risk management. 
When comparing the approaches to risk management that exist in Bank A and Bank B, Bank 
B appears to have a more apparent numerical approach to this. The bank has a greater 
quantitative enthusiasm than Bank A, and as it appears they frequently make use of this as a 
method for evaluating compliance with the internal system for risk management and for 
evaluating the need of improvements or new methods for risk management. Bank A on the 
other hand has a more holistic approach to risk management and the implementation of Basel 
II, something which is noted especially in a general dislike for quantitative parameters among 
our respondents. However, Bank A has become more numeric since the implementation of 
Basel II, as they have had to accept greater risk quantification and more quantitative methods 
for evaluating compliance. The banks differ in calculative cultures. Once again the more 
frequent reliance upon quantifiable evaluations and calculations suggests that Bank B shows 
traces of the calculative idealistic approach. On the other hand Bank A is more calculative 
pragmatic, relying more on client relationships and displaying a stronger dislike for 
quantitative analysis. However with the transition to Basel II it appears that Bank A may be 
on the way to becoming more calculative idealistic. 
A possible reason to this difference in attitude to risk management between the banks is the 
differing organisational structures within the banks. The more centralised Bank B is 
controlled from the top of the organisation. As a result of the higher power distance within 
Bank B, those in higher organisational levels may want to evaluate compliance on lower 
levels. Earlier studies have shown that uniformity and improved systems of control are liked 
by members from centralised banks.312 Other sources have also stated that uniformity can be a 
result of an emphasis on using numbers.313 Thus the centralised structure within Bank B may 
cause the bank to strive for uniformity. In order to obtain this uniformity they put a lot of 
emphasis on evaluation of risk management, through among other things focus on methods 
for risk calculation, within the organisation. This is in essence a very numeric attitude to risk 
management. 
Bank A on the other hand is a more decentralised organisation that believes in delegating 
responsibilities to local and regional offices. In the decentralised organisation the power 
distance is smaller and information travels more easily between these levels314. Other 
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researchers have argued that decentralisation and an organisation with a number of small units 
with a certain degree of independence is preferable. Wallander does not believe in success of
complicated systems, instead he believed that it is important for the organisation to work 
towards the same goal, while still maintaining a readiness to change.315 Such tendencies may 
exist in Bank A and this may be an explanation as to why Bank A is less fond of quantitative 
analysis. Bank A has instead chosen to focus more on the education of members within the 
organisation, perhaps in order to ensure that the organisation is moving in the same direction. 
5.3.5 Basel II and the Promotion of Centralised Management
When conducting his study Wahlström found a fear in decentralised banks that Basel II would 
promote increased centralisation at the expense of a more decentralised structure316. Further 
the Basel II Framework has been said to lead to uniformity, resulting in concentration of 
power to headquarters thus enhancing the value of centralised management317. The question is 
if these concerns have become realised now that the framework has been implemented in 
Sweden.
As can be seen from the discussion above Basel II is causing the two banks to become more 
alike with regard to their approaches to risk management. However, whether or not the 
decentralised Bank A is becoming more centralised is difficult to say without looking further 
into the bank’s history of risk management. Nonetheless, this study has shown that the bank is 
making more use of what is traditionally considered more centralised methods of risk 
management318, making more use of numeric approaches.
5.3.6 Reflection over Answers
Bank A and Bank B were both chosen for this study on the basis of their organisational 
structure. This has enabled us to analyse any differences in the practical application of Basel 
II between the two banks. 
The study found that Bank A has had a more difficult time accepting the more quantitative 
nature of the Basel II Framework. Initially Bank A has been a bank emphasising relationships 
with clients, and has not been fond of quantitative analysis. However with the transition to 
Basel II the bank has had to accept more methods involving this type of analysis. Bank B on 
the other hand have not voiced any negative criticism to the quantitative nature of Basel II, on 
the contrary they have stated that the bank focuses on the use of calculations in judging the 
compliance to Basel II within the organisation. 
The difference in attitudes between the two banks has led us to classify them differently in 
terms of their approaches to and attitudes towards risk management. Bank A seems 
traditionally to have been more holistic in their approaches to risk management however 
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Basel II has brought more numeric methods into their way of working. The transformation of 
Bank A also shows in when looking at their calculative culture. Prior to Basel II Bank A 
seems to have been more calculative pragmatic but since the implementation of the new 
framework they seem to be becoming more calculative idealistic. Bank B on the other hand 
appears to have had a more numeric approach to risk management already prior to the 
transition to Basel II and now since the implementation we can still see that they focus on 
calculations and numbers, typical of the numeric approach. Also, the bank has had a more 
calculative idealistic culture within the organisation and this has remained through the 
transition to Basel II. 
5.4 Compliance in the Application
After examining if there are any variations in the practical application of the Basel II 
Framework, the authors question how the different banks assure compliance with the 
framework. The CEBS, who gives advice to the European Commission on banking policy 
issues, has encouraged a consistent application of the framework.319 Hence, the authors
further questioned if the framework was administered in uniformity both within the banks and 
between banks. 
5.4.1 Uniform Application?
All respondents from both Bank A and Bank B were convinced that the Basel II Framework 
was applied uniformly among their different bank offices. An employee within credit risk 
management stated that all offices within Bank A are affected in the same way by the Basel II 
Framework through the internal models. The respondent further said that the application of 
the framework is observed and evaluated in the same way and therefore it must be applied in 
the same way. Further, a deputy credit manager at Bank A argued about the importance of 
education and keeping knowledge of the framework alive. According to him, it is important to 
understand the intent of the framework and the consequences of not applying it correctly. 
Even the respondents at Bank B confirmed that all their offices applied the framework in 
uniformity. According to them, they all used the framework and hence, the application must be 
the same. An office manager at Bank B explains that there is a tough control within the 
application of the framework and that they have no choice in the matter. However, a risk 
coordinator within risk management at Bank B points to the fact that the framework is not fully 
implemented yet, why the question of uniformity is hard to answer at this time. 
Hence, in their own view, both banks have uniform application within their organisations. This 
might be explained by the fact that, as stated by an employee within credit risk management at 
bank A, the banks uses internal models which contribute to a uniform application of the 
framework. This exemplifies how centralised the framework is. Even though evidence suggests
that there is a uniform application within both banks, the two banks have different emphasis on 
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what is important to assure a uniform application. In Bank A, they put strong emphasis on the 
employees’ understanding of the intent of the framework when applying it, whilst the office 
manager from Bank B stated that all employees know how to practically apply the framework in 
day-to-day activities but not everybody knows the intent behind it. 
Comparing the application of Basel II between different Swedish banks, the deputy risk manager 
in Bank A believes that it is applied in uniformity between the banks. However, over time, as the 
banks implement more advanced methods of calculation, the respondent believes that the
differences will increase. According to him, the foundation of the framework will always be the 
same, but when the banks implement more advanced methods of the framework, where each 
banks’ individual models are more advanced, the differences will increases. 
A credit manager at Bank B states that there are central organisations ensuring and 
supervising the different banks’ applications of framework and an employee at the Swedish
Financial Supervisory Authority states that; 
“We believe that the framework is applied uniformly in different Swedish 
banks and we have no reason to believe anything else. There are common 
criteria which they all need to fulfil. Sure, the banks may have different ways 
of solving things, but the framework is intended to be flexible. In general, it is 
applied uniformly.” 
The authors can see that the banks’ methods for applying the framework are similar between 
the two banks of different organisational structure. This could depend on the centralised 
structure of the framework and that it contributes to a certain way of application. As has been 
written earlier, with the implementation of Basel II in the Swedish banking system, the 
banking system will have to cope with more centralised ways of managing risk, with an 
increase in quantified measures of risk and a general focus on using numbers320. Hence, even 
in the decentralised organisation, the application becomes centralised and is applied in 
uniformity within the different offices. Wahlström argues that in line with Basel II, a 
decentralised organisation becomes less desirable. Evidence from the study suggests that even 
in the decentralised bank, the risk-management decisions are centralised. For the decentralised 
bank the utmost decision rests with the local branches but all decisions and check-ups are 
taken centrally. 
The main difference in the application between the banks is that Bank A puts emphasis on 
getting the employees to understand the intent of the framework whilst this is not considered 
as important in Bank B.
5.4.2 Compliance with the Framework  
The respondents mentioned that because of the tough control of the framework, both within 
the banks and from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, it is applied in uniformity. 
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But how do the banks achieve this control and how do they assure compliance with the 
framework?  
According to an employee at the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, there are different 
criteria which state that the framework shall be used in uniformity and the banks shall also 
have internal routines to assure the performance. Further, the banks’ internal auditing
department shall make sure that the Internal Ratings-Based systems (IRB-systems) are used is 
uniformity thorough the organisation. The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority has an 
annual supervision of the banks which use the IRB-systems and assure that these are 
performing in a correct manner. 
Hence, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority oversees that the banks use the 
framework in a correct way. They have certain rules for the banks’ internal auditing 
departments concerning how to manage the compliance with the framework. However, the 
authors were curious to see if and how the banks assure compliance with the framework. 
A deputy credit manager at Bank A states that to assure that the organisation follows the 
framework they have used education. He further states that the compliance is assured by the 
employees having enough support from the bank’s internal systems. Bank A has a regional 
unit which provides education and which takes random samples to ensure compliance. They 
also have a central unit which makes sure that the regional unit is performing correctly. 
However, he states, compliance is mainly a question of education. 
An employee within credit risk management at Bank A describes the bank’s supporting 
systems. According to him, these systems help with issues like how to rate a client, how to 
report defaults if these arise, or how much you need to pay for the risk of a client. Hence, the 
treatment of a client has a certain structure and support as how to treat the client in every 
office. With these methods the uniform application is ensured in all the offices of Bank A.
A private market manager at Bank A explains that they are using an IRB-system. According 
to the private market manager they have statistics on the credit decisions that have been taken 
and of loans that have not been paid and they also write failure-reports when risk evaluations 
of clients have turned out to be faulty. Further, they are supervised by the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority. He continues by stating that all the offices get information about the 
Basel II Framework on a regular basis. Further when an employee at a local office wishes to 
approve a loan to a client they have to put a loan application into the bank’s internal system. If 
they do not do this, they cannot get the credit contract for the client to sign. This procedure is 
necessary when rating a customer. Consequently, compliance with the Basel II Framework is 
assured through the bank’s internal systems. 
The evidence above suggests that Bank A’s structure of assuring compliance is centralised 
with a central department supervising the application of Basel II throughout organisation and 
further, the employees follow a certain structure in the daily application of Basel II. However, 
as written earlier, Bank A has a system where every office carries the responsibility for 
possible credit losses and in addition to each person being responsible for the risk they submit 
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the organisation to there is a local control of risk within different business areas321. Hence, 
even if the internal systems are supervised by central units, local offices carry a lot of the 
responsibility for assuring compliance and supervision of this, why a decentralised structure 
can still be distinguished in their organisation.  
Bank B also uses education to achieve compliance, but the respondents have not emphasised 
education when describing how the bank ensures compliance with the framework. Instead, a 
risk coordinator within risk management at Bank B states that when assuring the application
they concentrate at the use of calculations. A credit manager at Bank B continues by stating 
that the assurance of the application is managed by central units. He explains that every credit 
decision taken has a number and these numbers are collected and stored in a central data bank. 
The central unit is supervises and controls that all decisions are correct. 
Hence, in Bank B, the assurance is more centralised managed than in Bank A, with more 
emphasis on calculations and greater responsibility on the central department’s supervision. 
As has been written, many authors are critical to an over-reliance on numbers322 and 
according to Porter there has been a growing role of quantitative expertise323. The increased 
reliance on numbers is confirmed by an office manager at Bank B when stating that; 
“… everybody knows the practical application of the framework, but not 
everybody knows the intent behind it.”  
In her view, they did not have to know the intent. Just as argued in the De Larosière report, 
there seems to be a lack of understanding of risk and risk models in some financial 
institutions324. The authors find the lack of understanding and too big a trust in numbers are 
disturbing and as Chua argues that the problems with numbers tend to surface when numbers 
are taken out of their context and used as absolute neutral truths325. The authors fear that if 
some employees in Bank B lack understanding for the intent of the framework, every 
calculated scenario will be taken for a truth, and any errors in the system will more easily be 
missed. 
Further, as argued by Porter, the reliance on numbers minimises the need for intimate 
knowledge and personal trust326, and as we can see it is Bank A who puts more emphasis on 
education and less on calculations and who regards itself as a relation-bank. Further, the 
article by Chua states that the tradition of believing in numbers can be explained by people 
being convinced of the superiority of numbers327, and this convincing superiority might 
explain Bank B’s trust for calculations. 
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Bank B showed a greater reliance on calculations, which the authors attempt to explain 
through the discussion of Latour and Woolgar. They argue that an important aspect when 
people accept a statement is the fact that other similar statements have been made328. More 
than one statement has been seen as evidence that the statement is true329. Hence, the authors
fear that when enough authorities have confirmed the strength of these models, it may become 
a truth for employees at Bank B. We believe the risk to be greater in Bank B due to the 
smaller emphasis on understanding the intent of the framework.
Regarding the discussion above, the authors can see that both banks have internal systems for 
supervising compliance with the Basel II Framework and that both banks appear to fulfill the 
demands from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. Furthermore, both banks have a 
centralised structure of their work in assuring compliance with the Basel II Framework even 
though decentralised features can be distinguished in Bank A. The main difference in their 
assurance lies in what they emphasise. Banks A has a stronger emphasis on education thereby 
ensure that their employees understand and increase the possibilities that the employees will 
follow the intent of the framework. Bank B, on the other hand, put their emphasis on the use of 
calculation and the authors are concerned that they may risk becoming too convinced of the 
superiority of numbers.
Based on the discussion above, the authors believe that it is dangerous to rely too much on 
calculations. Bank B’s replies about the employees’ knowledge about the intent of Basel II was of 
concern to the authors and just as Chua, the authors believe it to be dangerous when numbers are 
taken for neutral truths330. As argued, many models have their flaws and we do not think that the 
Basel II Framework is any exception, why the authors believe it to be risky when people have too 
little understanding for the framework’s intent. In the long run, the authors believe that there will 
be a greater uniformity in a bank where the employees understand the intent behind their 
calculations. When ensuring the knowledge about the intent, the chances for uniform 
application are increased. When employees only know how to work with the system, without 
understanding the intent, they will not as easily react to disturbance or holes in the system. If 
there are any holes or any disturbances in the calculation system, the authors believe that these 
will be more easily discovered in Bank A.
5.4.3 Assurance of Knowledge 
Earlier a deputy credit manager in Bank A talked about that in order to secure that their work 
is applied in uniformity the employees need to understand the intent of the framework. Hence 
the authors further questioned how the knowledge about Basel II is assured. 
According to the private market manager in Bank A, the employees get education on a regular
basis. He explains that it is one thing to calculate the numbers in the system, but it is another 
thing to understand the intent of them. 
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In Bank B, on the other hand, the employees received more education in the early stages of 
implementing Basel II and no further education is given on a regular basis. Instead, according 
to them, when the education has been completed, it is completed. However, the risk 
coordinator within risk management at Bank B explains that, they have had a test to follow up 
the knowledge of the employees. An office manager at Bank B states that when it comes to 
the practical application of the framework, there is enough competence. But when it comes to 
the intent of the framework and how the calculations are built, there is a very little knowledge.  
Hence, one again it is confirmed that Bank A puts more focus on understanding the intent of 
the framework whist Bank B are more interested in learning the practical application of it. 
As argued by Lind, the roles of the Board and other senior officers are important in order to 
ensure certain knowledge about the degree of risk that the bank is subject to331. The authors
believe that Bank B should keep this in mind since there is a risk that some of their employees 
have less of an understanding of the intent of the Basel II Framework. It should lie in the 
interest of the Board and other senior officers to ensure the knowledge in the organisation. 
This because if an employee has less of an understanding of the intent, the authors believe 
there is a risk that they do not entirely understand the risks the bank is facing. 
5.4.5 Reflection over Answers 
In general, both banks apply the framework and supervise the compliance in similar ways. 
Both banks’ have centralised systems of risk management and supervision. The authors
believe that this is a result of the centralised structure of the framework. Though, as stated, 
some decentralised features could be distinguished in Bank A’s organisation.  
Lind argued that the aim of the supervision is to ensure that each bank is frequently analysed 
by a number of parties332, and as can be seen both banks have their internal systems for 
supervising compliance with the Basel II Framework and are supervised by the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority on a regular basis. It appears that both banks fulfill the demands from the 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority.
The main difference in the application is that Bank A puts more emphasis on getting the 
employees to understand the intent of the framework whilst this is not considered as important 
in Bank B. Regarding the compliance Bank A has a stronger emphasis on education whilst 
Bank B instead lays their emphasis on the use of calculations. Hence, the authors are concerned 
that Bank B risk becoming too convinced of the superiority of numbers. When the employees 
have little understanding of the intent of the framework, they have less understanding for the 
risk the bank is facing.
As stated by Wallander, the use of a complicated system will not be a solution for the 
banks333. Hence, complicated calculation will not protect banks from future crisis. Instead, 
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according to Wallander, it is important that the organisation works in the same direction and 
is ready for changes. 
5.5 An Evaluation of the New Framework
As stated, different risk models such as CAPM and value-at-risk have faced harsh criticism. It 
has been argued that the interpretations of CAPM are flawed, why its ability to provide value 
for investors in reality has been questioned334 and according to McGoun, CAPM is not a good 
measure when estimating risk335. In times of crisis these models tend to fall apart. Most 
models are built on assumptions that market data is random. Though, market prices cannot be 
seen as independent and random since people’s behaviour is influenced by risk measurements.
Consequently, these models will not work in times of crisis.336 Further, when managers use 
value-at-risk methods for controlling the market risks, their actions become similar which in 
turn amplifies the effects of the crisis.337 Hence, many risk models are ineffective and the 
problems arise in times of crisis. As argued by the De Larosière Report this is also true for the 
Basel II Framework, as in its creation too much emphasis has been put on recent economic 
data from periods of good liquidity338.
As argued by Young, there has been an increase in “risk management devices” and she 
explains this by stating that risk has come to be seen as a manageable phenomenon339.  In 
relation to these criticised measurements and the ever increasing focus on risk management
devices, the authors have focused on the Basel II Framework, with the intent of evaluating the 
opinions of this framework after the implementation in 2007. Earlier research was made 
before its implementation why the authors sought our respondents’ thoughts of the framework 
now, after it has been in use for some time. 
5.5.1 A General Optimism 
In accordance with the study done by Wahlström in 2009340, respondents from the more 
centralised Bank B have had a more positive attitude towards the new framework even after 
its implementation. A risk coordinator within risk management in Bank B described this new 
framework as a win-win-win-situation, where everybody gained. According to him, the 
bank’s capital requirements are lowered and the authorities have gained more control because 
of the increased transparency. Further, the clients have gained since the interest rates have 
been lowered. 
The optimism towards the framework is general for Bank B and a credit manager in Bank B 
argues that “the main strength with this framework is that you will set the right price on the 
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right customer.” He continued by explaining that in accordance with this new framework, the 
bank looks at the customers’ probability of default (PD). If a customer has a low PD, the bank 
will have a lower risk and hence they can set a lower price. Whoever has a higher PD should 
pay a higher price.
An office manager at Bank B states that this new framework provides better tools for 
calculating the return. She explains that it becomes easier to calculate what price to put on the 
customer and the system is more transparent than before. 
But unexpectedly, even Bank A has a positive attitude towards the new framework. The fact 
that Bank B expressed big pros with the framework was not surprising for to the authors since 
the Basel II Framework has an emphasis on using numbers and promotes uniformity, which is 
less in line with decentralised management341.   
A private market manager in Bank A states that the main strength of the framework is that 
stable customers will cost less money and, when looking at the total mass of customers, the 
framework is profitable for the bank. Further, an employee within credit risk in Bank A 
argues that the framework gives them an advantage in relation to their competitors because of 
their history of low losses and their way of viewing risk.  
Additional support of the Basel II Framework strengths is confirmed by the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority. An employee states that there are four big strengths of this framework; 
there is an increase in risk sensitivity, more focus at risk management and risk evaluations, 
and finally, the operational risks have gained more attention due to the more clear capital 
requirement. 
According to the private market manager in Bank A, with this new framework good and 
stable customers will cost less money. Further, stated by the deputy credit manager at Bank 
A; “Less stable customers will cost us more which is good since it is not economic 
defendable to keep bad customers.”
As written earlier, Bank A has had lower credit losses than its competitors. Therefore Basel II 
allows it to hold a lower level of required capital, thus the bank gains competitive advantages 
in relation to its competitors. The Basel II Framework has also strengthened the focus of the 
bank’s risk management.342 An explanation to the positive opinions toward the framework 
could therefore be that Bank A has realised the profitable benefits of the framework and seen 
that it strengthens their position compared to their competitors. 
A further reason as to why Bank A may have a positive attitude to Basel II could be their 
attitude to risk. In the report on capital adequacy and risk management for 2008 Bank A states
that each local office is a profit centre, hence each office takes the costs of bad clients. This 
results in bank employees having a more careful attitude towards risk.343 This view is further 
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strengthened by a respondent stating that the bank is more risk averse. An employee within 
credit risk in Bank A argues;
“It has been proven that we are pretty risk averse, we do not like to take 
risks that are too large… When we cross over to Basel II, that is a risk 
sensitive control measure, it pays to have low risks… In total we have lower 
capital needs…. Compared to our competitors we have greater benefit, 
partially based on a historically low level of loss and also because of our 
attitude towards risk.”
As such, Bank A is not only positive to Basel II due to the fact that they make profits as a 
result of it, but also their attitude to risks creates benefits for them compared to competitors.
As seen respondents from both banks have experience strengths of the Basel II Framework. 
However this was unexpected on the part of Bank A since the framework is less in line with 
decentralised management. As stated, different authors have argued that people are more open
towards change when they matches their pre-existing beliefs344. However, Bank A’s 
unexpected positive attitude might be explained by the fact that, despite resource demanding 
process of implementing the framework, it has lead to a decrease in the required capital base 
and the bank has had the possibility to earn more money and it has gained competitive 
advantages in relation to its competitors. 
5.5.2 Concerns of Complexity
The discussion above has presented a number of positive opinions on Basel II after it has been 
in use for some time. However, the study has also come across some negative opinions. 
A general complaint from both banks concerned the complexity of the framework. According 
to a risk coordinator within risk management at Bank B; 
“…it is a big disadvantage that the framework is so complex.”
A deputy credit manager at Bank A explains that all frameworks have their limits and 
regarding this framework he is concerned over the large amount of data that needs to be 
quantified and documented. He further states that the framework’s main difference from Basel 
I is that it contains more requirements for documentation. Hence, the framework is more 
complex and more resource demanding. This is confirmed by the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority that the Basel II Framework is more demanding for both banks and 
authorities. Further, Wahlström argued that decentralised banks worried that there would be a 
lack of applicability of the models in practise and that they were overly resource intensive and 
that the framework would lead to disadvantages for decentralised bank.
Though, according to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision it is important to repeat 
the objectives of the framework on a regulatory basis and the Committee intends to 
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continuously keep a dialogue with the banking industry and to continuously develop and 
improve the framework345. 
As stated, both banks were discontent with the complexity of the framework and the fact that 
the deputy credit manager at Bank A complained over the large amount of data that needs to 
be quantified is not surprising since decentralised banks lays more focus on developing 
personal relationships with its customers346 than on using numbers. The decentralised Bank A 
has even stated that they are a relation bank and hence it is not surprising that they are more 
sceptical towards the increase in risk quantification.
However, the complexity and the large amount of data might get reduced in time. Since the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision aims to repeat the objectives and improve the 
framework on a regular basis347, the authors believe that the end result has not yet been seen.
5.5.3 Over-reliance on Measurements 
An employee at the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority is concerned that there is a risk 
related to the IRB-models. He argues that;
“…there is a risk that there will be an over-reliance on these models.” 
According to him, under certain circumstances these models will not cover all risk aspects 
why they cannot be the only basis for evaluating risk. Hence, his advice is to avoid focusing 
too much on these models and realising that all models have their flaws.    
As has been argued, the Basel II Framework has an emphasis on using numbers348 and an 
over-reliance increases the risk for banks following the models to the letter but not by the 
intent. Hence, it is important that the people working with these models and numbers can 
interpret the information behind them349. As stated earlier, it is important that the banks put 
enough effort into education of their employees, avoiding a loss of understanding. The 
authors’ concern is that a more centralised bank, such as Bank B, will more easily fall into 
this trap of over-reliance. According to a study by Wahlström, who found that employees in 
more centralised organisations defined the quality of organisation partially by the ability to 
create models and collect data. Furthermore, the study showed a tendency among the 
employees towards feeling safe based on the idea that the information from risk 
measurements would reduce the risk of “bad” customers.350  
Talking to employees at Bank B suggests that the reliance on measurements has increased 
with the Basel II Framework and a credit manager at Banks B said that as a result of the 
transfer to Basel II the bank had seen an increase in the focus on using calculations. Further, 
                                               
345 www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm
346 Wahlström, G., Risk management versus operational action: Basel II in a Swedish context, (2009), p. 63
347 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm
348 Wahlström, G., Risk management versus operational action: Basel II in a Swedish context, (2009), p. 60
349 ter Bogt, H.J., Performance evaluation styles in governmental organizations, (2003), pp. 311-332; Young, 
J.J., Institutional thinking: the case of financial instruments, (1996), pp. 487-513
350 Wahlström, G., Risk management versus operational action: Basel II in a Swedish context, (2009), p. 63
69
an office manager at Bank B states that she is so involved in the system that she does not 
question the directives form the authorities. She does not consider whether the directives are 
good or bad. When the respondents from Bank B described both the application of Basel II 
and how compliance was ensured, they put a lot of emphasis on risk measurements. For 
example when describing the process of deciding on granting a credit, there was a lot of 
weight put into the risk category into which the client was placed by the internal risk 
measurement systems. This was unlike Bank A where we saw greater tendencies into valuing 
relationships with clients. 
Hence the authors see a more clear reliance on numbers and calculative measures in Bank B. 
And even if Bank A uses these measures as well, they put more focus on human relations and 
educating their employees in the intent of the framework351.  
5.5.4 Potential Enhancements on the Framework
When evaluating the framework after its implementation the authors further asked the
respondents if they would make any changes to the framework. 
What was common for all respondents was that they did not have any suggestions as to what 
they would improve in the framework, and if they had the opportunity they would only make 
smaller adjustments. In their views Basel II is a good framework in general and nothing big 
needs to be enhanced. 
However, the private market manager at Bank A argues that sometimes it feels like there is no 
logic as to the amount of work they need to put down on smaller credits. According to him, 
there should be a certain difference in the amount of work for bigger and smaller credits. He 
argues that when a framework is developed, which is supposed to be applicable in many
situations, the framework easily becomes very extensive. And according to him there might 
bee too many lawyers involved in the development and too few persons with practical 
experience. His statement is far from surprising for us. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision are constantly engaging the banking industry to produce quantified measures352
and as stated, Bank A has a history of being a relationship bank and the increased focus of 
quantification is not in line with their organisational structure. Further, the new framework 
demands that people report to the headquarters353 and this is less in line with their 
decentralised organisation structure354.  
Since the framework has been designed to be more forward-looking and the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision works with developing the framework when needed355, the 
respondents were further asked what they thought about possible changes of the framework in 
the future. They were all convinced that there will be further enhancements to the framework 
in the future.  
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The deputy credit manager in Bank A believes that there will be increased demands for 
supervision in the future. He believes that the framework will become more extensive with 
more requirements on documentation. He further believes that supervisory authorities will set 
higher requirements for stronger risk measurements and greater supervision over how these 
measurements are applied. According to an employee within credit risk management in Bank 
A, enhancements to the framework are coming but he does not know exactly what they will 
regard. But he believes that rules regarding exposures in certain customer-groups will be 
enhanced. Finally, a risk coordinator within risk management at Bank B agreed, stating that 
the framework will not stand still. He believed that people will learn from what has just 
happened and the framework will be adjusted there after.
Based on the replies of the respondents and comments made about the framework today the 
authors believe that the framework is going to change. As stated earlier, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision intends to rework the framework when it is needed and hence let it 
evolve over time 356.  Further, as written, that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
has taken actions to strengthen the Basel II Framework and intend to implement a program 
that increases the financial confidence and that avoids worsening current market conditions.357
5.5.5 Basel II - disadvantageous for decentralised banks?
Another concern voiced in Wahlström’s study was that Basel II would be disadvantageous for
decentralised banks358. There was a concern since the framework puts emphasis on using 
numbers while decentralised organisations, such as Bank A, focus on developing personal 
relationships with its customers359. The question is if this concern has become realised with 
the implementation of Basel II. This study suggests that Bank A has changed. It has gone 
from having a more holistic approach to risk management to becoming more numeric. In 
addition to this the attitude in the bank seems to be changing from the initially pragmatic 
attitude to a more calculative attitude. Based on the words of the respondents the authors drew 
the conclusion that Bank A has had a more difficult time coming to terms with the more 
quantitative nature of the framework than Bank B. 
However, the employees in Bank A are not entirely negative to the new Framework. The 
study has come across a number of positive opinions about the framework when interviewing 
respondents from Bank A. The respondents have commented that the transfer to Basel II has 
been profitable for them, also giving them a competitive edge to competitors. However, the 
authors question if the decentralised bank can be representative for other decentralised banks 
in this matter. This is due to the fact that a great deal of the reason behind why the 
respondents from Bank A have been positive to Basel II lies in the fact that it has been 
profitable. Yet the reason for the profitability lies in the fact that their risk averse nature is 
promoted by Basel II allowing them to gain a competitive edge on competitors. Thus it may 
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be their risk averse nature and not their decentralised structure that lies behind their positive 
attitude to Basel II. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is that Bank A seems to have gained 
from the transfer to Basel II. However, the authors believe that their risk averse nature has 
played an important role in giving the bank competitive advantages and thereby making the 
transfer more profitable. Therefore, the authors believe that even though Bank A might not 
have been disadvantaged, this conclusion cannot be valid for other decentralised banks that
might not have the same risk averse nature as Bank A. Also, one must consider the fact that 
Basel II has caused Bank A to become more numeric in their approaches to risk management. 
This not in line with their more decentralised organisational structure which may be viewed as 
a disadvantage. 
5.5.6 Reflection of Answers 
In general both banks are positive towards the Basel II Framework which, according to the
respondents helps set the right price on the right customer and hence it is profitable. As 
argued earlier, many risk measures have faced harsh criticism why one might wonder why 
they are so popular. Besides the fact that the framework has been profitable for the banks, as 
argued by Young, another explanation could be that risk is a phenomenon that can be 
controlled360. 
The results also showed that both banks felt that the framework was complex. Further, Bank 
A complained over the framework demand of resources. The authors also found that Bank B 
showed a greater reliance on risk measures why the authors are concerned that they may risk 
relying too much on the risk measures the use.
According to both banks future changes to the framework are to be expected, and as stated by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision they intend to implement a program that 
increases the financial confidence. Hence, the end result of the framework has not yet been 
seen.
In line with the evaluation of the Basel II Framework the authors were curios to study how 
Basel II copes with financial crises, especially since its intent is to strengthen the financial 
stability361. The curiosity was amplified by Daníelsson’s argument that Basel II only focuses 
on risks that are present in times of non-crisis362.
However when interviewing the respondents in this matter the authors found that they 
believed it to be too soon to have an opinion about this. For example, a deputy credit manager 
in Bank A stated that;
“…you need one or maybe even two recessions to get a credible judgement 
of the performance.”
                                               
360 Young J., Risk(ing) Metaphors (2001), pp. 614-618
361 www.bis.org/publ/bcbs109.htm
362 Daníelsson J., The emperor has no clothes: Limits to risk modelling (2002), p. 1293
72
He further stated that they have not fully implemented the framework yet, why the actual 
outcome of the framework cannot be analysed. In addition to this, an employee within credit
risk management at Bank A argued that since the framework was not implemented in the U.S. 
when the current financial crisis arose, it is not possible to draw any lines between the Basel II 
Framework and the current financial crisis. Furthermore this respondent also argued that it is 
too soon to evaluate whether this framework is successful or not.
The De Larosière Report assured that the Basel II is not to be seen as a cause of the financial 
crisis. The reason is that Basel II fist came into force on the 1 January 2008 and will not be 
enforced in the U.S. until 1 April 2010. Hence, it is too early to evaluate the effects 
framework and since it is not yet fully enforced, and as a result no lines can be drawn between 
the quality of the framework and the fact that another crisis has developed.
Even if it is too soon to evaluate the success of the Basel II Framework regarding its ability to 
give financial stability, the study has shown that it has been profitable for the banks, why the 
opinions in general are positive. 
5.6 Chapter Summary
The following sheets will give a short summary of the answers of the respondents. The 
answers are heavily shorted since the questions were extensive. In addition to this the authors
have separated the answers on different sheets depending on the questions given. The first 
sheet contains the answers from the employee at the Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority. The second sheet contains the answers from the central and regional offices of 
Bank A and Bank B and the final sheet contains the answers from the local offices of Bank A 
and Bank B. 
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Questions Employee at the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority
In general how have you experienced Swedish Good! They have managed their
banks' implementation and work with Basel II? commitments seriously
Have you noticed any differences in the That I cannot answer. Though, there is a 
implementation process of centralised and difference between smaller and
decentralised Swedish banks? larger Swedish banks
Have you noticed that banks of different That is hard to answer
organisational structure have had an easier or 
harder time implementing Basel II?
Do you perceive that Basel II is applied Yes, they all have to live up to certain critera
uniformily among different Swedish banks?
Do you perceive that Basel II is applied Yes, they have criteria to follow
uniformly within Swedish banks?
How do you ensure Swedish banks' compliance We have done random sampling, and
with Basel II? there are criteria for them to follow. Further,
we annually supervise their work
Have you experienced any negative aspects of Yes, there is risk for over-reliance on 
Basel II? measurements
Have you experienced any positive aspects of Yes, there is an increase in risk sensitivity,
Basel II? more focus at risk management and risk 
evaluations, and finally, the operative risks has 
gained more attention
If you had the opportunity, would you change I cannot point at something specific. 
anything about the framework? I would only make smaller adjustments
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Questions Risk Coordinator Employee within Risk Deputy Credit 
within Risk 
Management in Bank 
B
Management in Bank A Manager in Bank A
Would you describe Both Mainly decentralised Decentralised
your organisation as 
centralised or decentralised?
How does your process for It has been Through supportive The central 
implementing the Basel II implemented gradually systems adjusted for the organisation has the 
Framework look? with a large work in needs of Basel II. formal responsibility 
the IT-department Decisions for Basel II are of organising the 
taken from the central adoption, while the 
organisation local and regional 
offices are 
responsible for the 
day-to-day 
application
Has your current No, the organisational No, but our culture made Prior to Basel II, the 
organisational structure structure is the same us implement the frame- bank was less
had any effect on the now as then work in line with the formalised
implementation process? organisational culture
With regard to your Clients in some That fact that we are very The framework sets 
organisational Business areas risk averse has given us the right price on the 
structure, are there any have not understood advantages in relation to right customer, while 
positive and negative the new system Our competitors. less stable 
aspects of the framework? The pro- cyclicality is the customers will cost 
main negative aspect more   
How did you experience the Nothing bad to remark It has been time Now there is more
Implementation of Basel II? demanding to quantify
Have offices of different size Hard to answer Yes, in a large office you Yes, smaller offices 
have experienced the have more people to ask with smaller credits 
implementation process will less affected
differently?
Have you experienced any Complex The complexity Now there is more to 
negative aspects of quantify and 
Basel II?
document and it is 
more complex
Have you experiences any A win-win-win We have gained It has not been used 
Positive aspects of Basel II? situation with lowered competitive advantages long enough, we 
capital requirement, cannot evaluate it 
Interest rates and yet
more control
Do you think that Basel II is Hard to say since the Yes Yes
applied uniformly process is not
by all your offices? complete yet
Do you think that Basel II is It is not fully Hard to answer Yes, but there will be 
applied uniformly by implemented yet larger differences 
other banks? when the more 
advanced method is 
implemented
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How do you ensure We focus on the Through the use of Through education, 
compliance with Basel II use of calculations internal systems and random sampling 
within the organisation? education and supportive 
systems. But mainly 
through education
How do you ensure that your Education in the Education Education
employees have enough beginning, then only 
knowledge and some random tests
understanding of Basel II?
If you had the opportunity, No Maybe some practical Hard to answer
would you change anything parts in the reporting, 
about the framework? nothing big
With regard to the current It is good It would have been good if It is a good 
financial crisis, what is your the framework was in use framework. The 
general opinion of Basel II? three years ago financial crisis is 
rather an effect of 
other effects
Do you think that there Yes Yes Yes
will be any changes made to 
the framework in the future?
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Questions Office Manager Credit Manager Private Market 
in Bank B in Bank B Manager in Bank A
Would you describe your organisation Both Both Decentralised
as centralised or decentralised?
How does your process of The implementation The We have people in
implementing the Basel II Framework was managed by implementation charge on both 
look? the central was managed by central and regional 
organisation the central level, and the office 
organisation managers worked 
with the practical 
application
Has your current organisational No Hard to say, it Since we only have 
structure had any effect on the has been smooth three levels, central, 
implementation process? process regional and offices, 
it did not take long 
to get the 
information out 
in the organisation
With regard to your organisational Good guidelines to Not in particular Not in particular 
structure, have you experienced any respond to, it is  
positive or negative aspects of the more clear now
framework?
How did you experience the Some parts where The process ran More fair
implementation of Basel II in your easy to smoothly, any parameters,
office? implement, holes have been but much more to 
some needed corrected take into account
more work gradually
Do you think offices of different size It is easier to niche Yes, you have Yes, there is more 
have experienced the implementation the competence in more people to knowledge in a 
process differently? a larger office ask in a bigger larger office
office
Have you experienced any negative No, we are raised No It is more complex 
aspects of Basel II in your office? to believe the now
authorities
Have you experiences any positive Better tools now Yes, now you put Stable customers 
aspects of Basel II in your office? the right price on will cost less
the right 
customer
Do you think that Basel II is Yes, it is a very Yes Yes
applied uniformly by all hard control
offices within the organisation?
How do you ensure compliance with Through supervisory We have a Through 
Basel II within the organisation and systems supervised continuous testing 
your office?
system and education
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How do you ensure that employees Education in the Education in the Education
within the office have enough beginning beginning. Not
Knowledge and understanding On a regulatory 
of Basel II? basis
If you had the opportunity, would you Maybe even No Less resource 
change anything about the framework? better tools demanding 
regarding
smaller credits
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6. Conclusions
This chapter will summarise the answers to our focus questions. The authors will further 
reveal the theoretical contribution of our thesis. The chapter ends with suggestions for further 
research.
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined how two Swedish banks with different organisational structure 
practically apply the Basel II Framework and further look into whether the framework is 
applied in uniformity, how the banks secure compliance and the respondents’’ opinions of the 
framework now that it has been in use for some time. 
Starting the discussion in the current financial crisis it has been argued that many models for 
risk assessment underestimate risk exposure. Further, the study has looked deeper into risk 
measures stating that many of these models tend to fall apart in times of crisis and that they as 
such are not always reliable measures.  
The Basel II is a relatively new framework which was available for implementation first in the 
year-end 2007, and compared to its predecessors it is a more flexible and adaptable 
framework. Hence, the authors were curious to examine the opinions towards this framework 
since other risk measurements have received harsh criticism. 
In the chapter of current discussion the authors stated that the framework is intended to 
constantly evolve with the market why it was even more interesting to examine the opinions 
of the respondents and whether the framework needs further enhancement.
Furthermore Wahlström found that the Basel II Framework was less in line with a 
decentralised structure and it was argued that it would be disadvantageous for a decentralised 
organisation. With this in mind the authors wanted to study two banks of differing 
organisational structure, one more centralised and one more decentralised, to see if the 
opinions of the frameworks differ. 
Furthermore, according to Mikes, systematic variations in risk management exist in practice 
why the authors further questioned if there was any variation in the practical application of the 
Basel II Framework between the two banks of different organisational structure. 
This discussion led down to the focus questions; how do these two Swedish banks practically 
apply the Basel II framework? Are their any variations in their practical application? How do 
they secure uniform application and compliance with the Basel II Framework? And further, 
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what are their opinions on the Basel II Framework now when it has been in use for some 
time? The answers to these questions will be presented in the section below.
6.2 Answers to the Focus Questions 
6.2.1 How do these two Swedish banks practically apply the Basel II 
framework? 
In Bank A the central organisation is in charge of the formal work with Basel II and they are 
as such responsible for the interpretation of the regulation and also the development of the 
models required by Basel II. The central organisation also prepares the ground work for the 
rest of the organisation to work with. Furthermore Bank A has a central credit department that 
prepares decisions taken by the board or its credit committee. This department also has the 
task of ensuring that credit decisions are made uniformly throughout the organisation and that 
the decisions are taken in line with decisions made by the board. The regional organisations 
are responsible for the education of all involved personnel within the region and they are 
responsible for making sure that the local offices apply the framework. The local office 
employees are those who conduct the daily practical implementation of Basel II. Bank A 
argues that the local offices are best suited to judge the credit worthiness of clients and as 
such the bank has emphasised the importance of support functions and education in order to
aid the local offices in making their decisions. Bank A has an internal risk measuring system 
that ensures reliable and uniform measurements of credit risk. Risk is classified according to 
internal ratings based on the client’s possibilities of paying back the loan.
In Bank B there is a central organisation that directs and controls the practical implementation 
of Basel II within the bank. The central organisation develops the models for risk 
management that are later to be applied throughout the organisation as required by the Basel 
II Framework. The bank has different decision levels concerning credit issues. The larger the 
size of the credit, the higher up in the organisation the credit decision will be made. Bank B 
has a committee that works with the identification, defining, measurement and monitoring of 
risks as set out by external and internal regulation. The overall responsibility for ensuring the 
complete risk management as set out by the Board lies upon the President and Chief 
Executive Officer of the bank. Bank B has two committees that have been assigned the task of 
ensuring the practical application of the Board’s intentions of risk management and control. 
The committees accept policies for implementation of risk management and control and the 
handle the overall risk levels of Bank B and its divisions. One of the committees also has
decisive powers in areas such as methods for measuring risk, limitations to risk and capital 
management. The bank also has a committee that monitors credit, market, operational and 
liquidity risk. The daily risk management within the bank is the responsibility of its divisions, 
treasury and support functions. When considering granting credit to a client, Bank B considers 
the creditworthiness of the client, the type of credit, covenants or collateral as well as the 
client’s current and predicted future financial situation. All clients are rated using the same 
risk classes and probability of default scale with adjustments made for the industry of the 
client.
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6.2.2 Are their any variations in their practical application? 
Throughout the completion of this thesis the authors noticed that Bank A and Bank B had 
different responses to the initial implementation of Basel II within the banks. Bank A was 
more sceptical to the quantitative material that was needed in the applications to the Swedish
Financial Supervisory Authority. The bank had in the past not been impressed by quantitative 
analysis and preferred to describe themselves a bank emphasising client relationships. 
Furthermore the bank was convinced that the employees at local offices could best make 
credit decisions of the clients. Bank B on the other hand was more positive to the initial 
implementation of Basel II. They did not mention that they had had any difficulties or 
problems with the quantitative analysis required by Basel II nor did they offer any negative 
opinions as to the use of such analysis. 
Based on these responses the conclusion was drawn that Bank A was less positive to the 
quantitative dynamics required in the implementation of Basel II. The authors argue that the 
reason for this is the organisational culture of the bank, where client relations are important, 
and thus other parameters than quantitative may be seen as more important. The authors argue 
that the fact that Bank B is more positive to the quantitative dynamics of Basel II is a result of 
the fact that a greater emphasis on numbers contributes to uniformity within the organisation, 
which is more in line with the goals of a centralised organisation. 
In addition to the differences in attitudes towards risk quantification, the study showed
differences in the banks’ approaches to risk management and their calculative cultures. The 
authors found that the approach to risk management in Bank A has been altered with the 
transfer to Basel II. The interviews suggested that initially Bank A had a more holistic 
approach to risk management. Little focus was put on risk quantification, and in essence it 
was not popular within the organisation. However, with the transfer to Basel II the bank is
moving towards a more numeric approach to risk management. The Bank has since the 
transfer to Basel II increased the supervision of risk evaluations, and deviations from 
projected risk evaluations are analysed and added to statistical databases. Moreover there has 
been an increase in the number of risk classifications into which a client can be classified and 
the employees must look at a greater number of parameters when evaluating potential clients. 
The respondents also believed that there is an increase in documentation and follow-up still to 
come. However, despite these more numeric tendencies within Bank A the bank still shows 
traces of its more holistic approach to risk management. For example employees within the 
bank have argued that the quantitative analysis that is used is only complementary when 
evaluating risk in clients. The authors also received answers that argued that the parameters 
introduced since the implementation of Basel II were insufficiently focused upon differences 
in clients, and as such the same parameters were reviewed and amount of work needed to be 
done concerning a smaller loan was the same as a larger loan within the same category. 
Another holistic tendency in Bank A took the form of the focus of the education about Basel 
II given to the employees where emphasis was put on understanding the reasoning behind 
Basel II and risk taking within the bank. 
Compared to Bank A, the study suggested that Bank B had a more numeric approach to risk 
management. In general Bank B seems to have adopted Basel II with a more positive attitude 
than Bank A. Already in 2006 the bank introduced a tool for better registering issues related 
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to risk within the bank. Furthermore the bank has a department that follows up credit granting 
documents to see if the projections were correct. The bank also follows up compliance with 
the risk calculation templates to ensure that they are used. There is also a system in place that 
identifies faulty risk evaluations. This is done in order to enable improvements of the system. 
Furthermore employees in the bank have stated that the bank makes use of numerous 
procedures for following up and examining the use of models. Based on this information the 
conclusion was drawn that prior to the implementation of Basel II the bank may have had a 
more numeric approach to risk which is shown by for example the implementation of a risk 
tool in 2006. Furthermore the study suggests that the bank has chosen to implement Basel II 
in line with the numeric approach, submitting all levels of the bank to studies of compliance 
and to see if systems for risk management within the bank can be improved. 
The study also showed differences in calculative cultures between Bank A and Bank B. Prior 
to the implementation of Basel II Bank A had a more calculative pragmatic tradition within 
the bank, where client relationships were important and quantitative analysis was not widely 
used. However, with the introduction of Basel II, the bank seems to be moving towards 
becoming more calculative idealistic. The evidence for this is shown by the increase of 
documentation on risk evaluation practices and the follow-up of such evaluations. Also the 
bank has introduced a greater number of parameters on which to base client evaluations and
respondents argue that these parameters give a better and a more fair evaluation than what 
was done before. 
Concerning Bank B the study found evidence to suggest that the bank has a calculative 
idealistic approach. The bank makes frequent use of quantifiable evaluations. Furthermore the 
Bank puts great emphasis on the improvement of systems that are used within the bank. Also, 
compliance with Basel II within the bank is mainly judged by making use of calculations. In 
addition to this the respondents have not voiced any negative views on the bank’s risk 
management techniques. The authors judge this lack of critique as a sign of a positive attitude 
to quantitative evaluations within the bank.
It has been argued that these differences in approaches and attitudes of Bank A and Bank B 
are consequences of the differing organisational structures within the banks. Bank A is a more 
decentralised bank that believes in the delegation of responsibilities to local and regional 
offices. The authors believe that Bank A’s initial dislike for the quantitative analysis linked to 
Basel II can be explained by linking this to Wallander’s disbelief in the success of 
complicated systems and the importance of working towards the same goal. The authors
believe that Bank A in line with this chooses rather to focus on education, perhaps in order to 
secure that employees are working in the same direction, rather than promoting the use of 
quantitative analysis. 
Bank B on the other hand has a more centralised structure which means that they may be
more inclined to like uniformity and improved systems of control. Uniformity can be 
achieved by emphasising the use of numbers. As such the authors believe that the centralised 
structure of the bank makes them strive for uniformity which they achieve through emphasis 
on evaluation of risk management and a focus on numbers. 
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The conclusion that is reached is that there are variations in how the two banks practically 
apply the Basel II Framework. It has been argued that one of the main reasons for this is the 
differing organisational structure of the banks. However, the study has also seen evidence that 
the decentralised Bank A may be becoming more like the centralised Bank B as a result of the 
increased emphasis on numbers and quantitative analysis that is a result of the implementation 
of Basel II. 
6.2.3 How do they secure uniform application and compliance with the 
Basel II Framework?
All of the respondents from both Bank A and Bank B were convinced that the Basel II 
Framework was applied uniformly throughout the banks. Within Bank A the internal models 
for observing and evaluating work with Basel II cause different offices to apply the 
framework in the same way. A respondent from Bank B argued that that the tough control 
within the framework results in uniform application. However, even though the banks both 
appear to have uniform application of the framework, there are differences in what they 
believe is important to assure uniformity in application. Bank A focuses on creating an 
understanding of the intent of the framework among employees who apply it. However, in 
Bank B the study found that greater emphasis is put on being able to apply the framework but 
not so much on the actual intent. Thus, even though both the banks believe that the framework 
is applied in uniformity we can still see that there are differences between them. In addition to 
this one of the respondents has commented that with time, the differences will increase 
between applications in different banks. Not only the banks themselves believe that the 
framework is applied in uniformity but so does the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
who says that they have no reason to believe otherwise. The authors believe that the 
similarities between how the banks have chosen to apply the framework can be explained by 
the centralised structure of the framework, making it contribute to a certain way of 
application. 
In order to secure compliance with the Basel II Framework the authors found that Bank A 
believes in the education of employees. Employees within the bank have also stated that 
compliance can be ensured by support from internal systems. The internal systems give the 
employees information on how to rate customers and how to report failures. In conclusion the 
general matter of ensuring compliance is a centralised matter within Bank A, with a central 
organisation supervising the application of the entire organisation. Furthermore employees 
must follow a certain structure in their application. However, despite the centrality of 
compliance, the local offices carry a lot of responsibility for ensuring compliance and 
supervision, enabling the authors to distinguish a decentralised structure in their organisation. 
When Bank B works with ensuring compliance with the Basel II Framework, they emphasise 
the use of calculations. Further the assurance of performance is managed by central units and 
all credit decisions are numerated and stored in a central database where a central unit 
supervises and controls the decisions. In general the study has found that the assurance of 
compliance is a more centralised in Bank B who put more emphasis on calculations and 
greater responsibility on the central organisation’s supervision. 
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The authors have found earlier studies stating that quantitative arguments are less easily 
dismissed and a reliance on numbers should decrease the need for intimate knowledge and 
personal trust. The study found evidence of this in the banks, where Bank B relied more on 
numbers than Bank A who preferred to put more emphasis on education and less on 
calculations. Other studies have said that the tradition of believing in numbers may explained 
by people being convinced of the superiority of numbers, which may explain Bank B’s trust 
in calculations. 
The authors have also attempted to discuss Bank B’s reliance on numbers through the studies 
of Latour and Woolgar who argue that statements are taken for truths depending on how the 
statements are made. Further they state that when statements have been repeated enough times
they tend to transfer into truths that are no longer questioned. In Bank B, there is more of a 
culture of believing in numbers when discussing whether to approve a loan or not. As the 
culture of believing in numbers is repeated by people with authority, such as the managers, it 
has become the truth in the bank. Furthermore Latour and Woolgar can also be used to 
explain the less quantitative nature of Bank A. The bank has a long tradition of focusing on 
client relationships and not using quantitative analysis. As such this has become the truth in 
the bank, making it more difficult for them to accept the quantitative nature of Basel II and 
also explaining why they have been less prone to rely on numbers. 
The study has also touched upon the assurance of knowledge about Basel II. Bank A argues 
that in order to achieve uniform application there is a need for an understanding of the intent 
of the Basel II Framework among the employees. This has resulted in education of employees 
on a regular basis. However in the case of Bank B, the employees are primarily educated in 
the beginning and thereafter education is not given on a regular basis. In the opinion of Bank 
B, one education opportunity is enough and the main priority is that employees can work 
practically with day-to-day issues. 
The conclusion reached in this area is that both of the banks appear to apply the Basel II 
Framework uniformly. However, there banks have differing focus. Bank A believes in 
compliance and uniformity through a greater understanding of the framework and its intent. 
However Bank B has a greater focus on numbers in achieving compliance. 
6.2.4 What are their opinions on the Basel II Framework now when it has 
been in use for some time? 
When conducting interviews for this thesis the authors found that the general opinion among 
the respondents concerning Basel II now when it has been implemented for some time is 
positive. Bank B has described the adoption of the framework as a win-win-win situation 
where all involved parties gain. The bank further argued that the framework enabled them to 
make better judgements of clients and thereby they could set the correct price. Another 
respondent said that the framework enabled better calculations of return and made it easier to 
put a price on the risk of a client. 
The authors, in their opinion somewhat unexpectedly, also found that Bank A had a positive 
attitude towards the new framework. The authors had not thought that they would find such 
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results, as earlier studies have argued that Basel II is less in line with decentralised 
management and fears have been expressed that the framework would be disadvantageous for 
decentralised banks, due to the emphasis on numbers. 
One of the positive opinions expressed by Bank A was that the framework gave the bank an 
advantage in comparison to other banks. This was due to the risk averse nature of Bank A. 
Other respondents also commented that stable customers cost less money, which on the whole 
was profitable for the bank. 
The authors have argued that one of the reasons for Bank A’s positive opinions of Basel II has 
been that despite the resource demanding process of implementing the framework, it has been 
a profitable process for the bank as it has lead to a decrease in the capital base which has also 
given them advantages in relation to other banks. The reason that they have been able to have 
a lower capital base is that the historically low level of loss, which is a result of the bank’s 
risk averse nature. 
The discussion above focuses on the positive opinions of Basel II that we came across during 
this study; however, even if the general opinion of Basel II was positive, some negative 
opinions were also voiced. 
The authors found that one of the more general complaints from both banks was the degree of 
complexity of the framework. A respondent from Bank A commented that the framework 
brought with it a greater need of documentation, and also larger amounts of data needed to be 
both quantified and documented. 
Another concern noted in relation to the Basel II Framework concerns an over-reliance on 
measurements. This concern was raised by an employee at the Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority. As is known the Basel II Framework emphasises the use of numbers and an over 
reliance on such numbers may risk models being followed by the letter but not the intent. The 
authors’ concern is that Bank B may more easily fall into the trap of over reliance, due to their 
focus on matters of quantitative nature. Furthermore, Bank B does not put as much emphasis 
on their employees understanding the intent of the framework with which they are working. 
In order to get a clearer picture as to our respondents’ thoughts on Basel II, the study included 
a question on potential enhancements in our interviews. The general picture was that the 
respondents did not want to make any drastic changes to the framework and that in general it 
was a good framework. 
The conclusion drawn concerning the capabilities of the Basel II Framework now that it has 
been in use for a while is that the general opinion among both banks and the Swedish
Financial Supervisory Authority is positive. However, both banks and the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority have areas of the framework which they would like to improve. 
Concerning the complaints we have seen how the opinions of Bank A are very much in line 
with their decentralised structure and how they do not like to focus on quantitative analysis.
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Prior to the implementation of Basel II concerns were raised that the framework would be 
disadvantageous for decentralised banks. The study has found that Bank A seems to have 
gained from the transfer to Basel II, however this may be a result of their risk averse nature. 
However, Bank A is evolving, becoming more numeric in their attitude towards risk 
management, something which may be considered a disadvantage. 
6.3 Theoretical Contribution
Earlier methods of risk management have received critique for not holding in times of crisis 
or for being fundamentally flawed. The Basel II Framework is based on a division of risk into 
three categories and the Framework is more flexible and adaptable than earlier regulation in 
the area. Other studies have been conducted in relation to Basel II but this study contributes to 
the discussion in several ways. 
Earlier studies, such as those of McGoun, have focused on theoretical analysis of portfolio 
models and CAPM as forms of risk management. McGoun chose to take a theoretical 
approach to risk management where he has used logic reasoning to reach the conclusion as to 
the flaws of the portfolio model CAPM. The study has not looked at how the portfolio models 
were used practically, something which has been central to this study of the Basel II 
Framework.
Other studies, such as that of Mikes, have had a structure more similar to ours. However, 
Mikes has not looked at the practical application of the Basel II Framework. Instead her study 
has looked at enterprise risk management. The conclusions reached by Mikes can therefore
not be applied to the application of Basel II. This study focuses on the application of Basel II, 
in order to enable such conclusions on the behalf of this framework. 
Furthermore the authors have, just as Wahlström, looked at differences between centralised 
and decentralised banks. However, Wahlström’s study aimed at looking into the banks’ 
opinions on the Basel II Framework while this study has looked at the practical application of 
the framework in banks of differing organisational structure. 
In addition to this, earlier studies have been conducted and completed prior to the actual 
implementation of Basel II. Basel II was not in use when these studies were conducted and 
therefore they have only been able to cast a light on beliefs about Basel II and what the 
consequences of the framework were thought to be. Contrary to earlier studies this study has
been able to draw conclusions based on the practical application of Basel II when it is actually 
in use. 
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6.4 Reflections on the Conclusions of the Thesis
When conducting this thesis the authors have only looked at two Swedish banks. This may 
appear to be a small sample of Swedish banks but the goal was not to study the practical 
application of Swedish banks in general. Instead it was the aim of this thesis to look at the 
practical application within one centralised and one decentralised Swedish bank. Furthermore 
the authors wanted to compare banks of similar size. If the authors had interviewed a greater 
number of banks they would also have had to look at smaller Swedish banks. This would have 
enabled the authors to draw more general conclusions but it would also have added another 
component to the analysis. The authors did not want to add another component as it would 
have lead to a broader purpose of this thesis. A broader purpose may have made the extent of 
the thesis too wide to handle given the amount of time given for writing to the thesis. 
Furthermore as the study continued the authors came to notice that the decentralised bank in 
the study may not be completely decentralised. The authors found that the risk management 
within the bank was to some extent centralised. Perhaps it would have been possible to find a 
bank that was more genuinely decentralised. However, when deciding on which bank to 
choose, the authors found that this bank is strongly portrayed as a decentralised bank. As the 
authors only noticed the more centralised tendencies after the study had begun, they did not 
want to go back to search for another bank. 
For the completion of this thesis three respondents from each bank were interviewed. If more 
respondents were interviewed then perhaps more strength could have been added to the 
conclusions. However, as is in line with the grounded theory approach the authors have 
interviewed the number of respondents needed until the respondents started repeating 
themselves. When the authors found that they were receiving the same or similar answers 
from the respondents they chose to not to search for more respondents. Also, the authors
ended each interview by asking the respondents if they knew anyone else that could be 
interviewed. The authors found that the respondents started referring to each other and as such 
drew the conclusion that they had conducted enough interviews. One may still argue that the 
authors should have interviewed more respondents from the same offices and departments; 
however, when attempting to find such people to interview, the potential respondents that the 
authors reached often said that the authors should speak to the same people as they had 
already interviewed. The authors also found that in the smaller offices there were often only 
one or two people who felt they were knowledgeable enough to answer the questions. When 
these people had been interviewed, there were no further people left to interview. 
A reader may also question the logic of which questions the authors chose to give to the
respondents. As can be seen in appendices 3-4 the study had two sets of questions for the
employees at the banks which were interviewed. The reasoning behind this was that the 
authors believed that employees at more local offices may have a difficult time answering 
some of the more detailed questions and that these may be more suited for the central or 
regional organisations. What may seem illogical is that two respondents from Bank A were 
asked the more central questions while only one person at Bank B was asked these questions. 
The authors’ original plan was to ask the more central questions to employees at the 
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headquarters and regional offices of the banks. The authors were able to achieve this with 
Bank A. However, the respondent from the headquarters of Bank B did not have time to 
answer the questions and instead referred the authors to a respondent at a regional office for a 
more central response. The employee at the headquarters of Bank B was the boss of this 
respondent from a regional office. As such the authors received a more centralised response 
from the regional respondent at Bank B. Instead of finding another respondent at a regional 
office to interview, the authors decided to look at two local offices of Bank B. Despite the 
differences in questions, the authors still believe that the choice of respondents is in line with 
the study as the aim was not to study how application differed between central offices and 
local offices in the banks. However, the authors did aim to find a spread of respondents so that 
they did not just interview employees from the central or local organisation. The authors still 
believe that they have managed to achieve a spread between the respondents. 
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research
A conclusion that can be drawn when reading this thesis is that it is of the type that perhaps 
creates more questions than it is in itself able to answer. As such the authors have a number of 
ideas for potential future studies that should be undertaken. 
This study has mainly focused on looking at differences between centralised and decentralised 
banks. When choosing banks, the authors also chose to look at larger Swedish banks. 
However the authors feel that if this subject were to be further pursued a study of potential 
differences in practical application of Basel II in banks of varying sizes would beneficial. This 
is a relevant issue due to the costs of implementing Basel II and that such costs may be felt 
more by smaller banks. Furthermore, the larger and smaller banks vary in complexity and as 
such Basel II has opened up for the possibility of choosing different levels of complexity363. 
These choices may be mirrored in the practical application. The authors also suspect that there 
will be different levels of expertise in banks of varying sizes, something which may contribute 
to varying practical applications of the framework. 
Another issue worth pursuing is the practical application of Basel II in different countries. The 
Basel II Framework has a basis which is the same for all. However if different countries can 
provide a good reason, there is a possibility of choosing options that allow for national rules 
that differ from Basel II.364 As such, it would be of interest to study the degree to which such 
options have been used and also how these may affect the application of Basel II. It would 
also be of interest to look the application of Basel II in branches of Swedish banks in other 
countries. 
Yet another interesting area for future research is linked to the timing of this study. When 
writing this thesis the financial crisis has not blown over and as such many questions 
regarding Basel II and the financial crisis cannot yet be answered. It may therefore be 
                                               
363 Lind, G., Basel II – nytt regelverk för bankkapital (2005), p. 14
364 Ibid.
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interesting to, in the future, study any changes in the application of Basel II prior to and after 
the financial crisis. 
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Appendix
Appendix 1 - Specification of Interviewees/respondents
The purpose of this appendix is to give the reader a more detailed specification on our 
respondents. 
Respondent from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
Employee at the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
This respondent works at the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen. 
The respondents duties are to overlook compliance with Basel II among Swedish Banks. 
Furthermore the respondent works at the Stockholm office of Finansinspektionen. 
Respondents from Bank A
Employee within Credit Risk Management
The respondent works at the headquarters of Bank A and is responsible for the calculation, 
analysis and reporting of credit risk within capital adequacy. 
Deputy Credit Manager
The respondent works at one of the regional offices of Bank A. The respondent is the deputy 
credit manager in this region. 
Private Market Manager
The respondent works at one of the local offices in the southern region of Bank A. The 
respondent is further more manager of the private market side of the office and responsible for 
credit granting within this area. 
Respondents from Bank B
Risk Coordinator within Risk Management
The respondent works at one of the regional offices of Bank A. The respondent works within 
risk management had has the role of risk coordinator and is also responsible for operative 
risks. 
Credit Manager
The respondent works at one of the local offices in the southern region of Bank B. The 
respondent has the role of credit manager for a district within the southern region. 
Office Manager
The respondent works at one of the smaller local offices in the southern region of Bank B. 
The respondent is the office manager of this office and as such is utmost responsible for the 
risk management within the office. 
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Appendix 2 - Interview Questions to the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority
1. I allmänhet, hur upplever ni svenska bankers implementering av och arbete med Basel 
II? In general how have you experienced Swedish banks’ implementation and work 
with Basel II?
2. Upplever ni någon skillnad i implementeringen av Basel II hos decentraliserade och 
centraliserade svenska banker? Have you noticed any differences in the 
implementation process of centralised and decentralised Swedish banks?
3. Har ni upplevt att banker med olika organisationsstruktur har haft lättare eller svårare 
att implementera Basel II? Have you noticed that banks of different organisational 
structure have had an easier or harder time implementing Basel II? Have you noticed 
that banks of different organisational structure have had an easier or harder time 
implementing Basel II?
4. Upplever ni att Basel II tillämpas enhetligt av olika svenska banker? Do you perceive 
that Basel II is applied uniformly among different Swedish banks?
5. Upplever ni att Basel II tillämpas enhetligt inom svenska banker? Do you perceive that 
Basel II is applied uniformly within Swedish banks?
6. Hur säkerställer ni svenska bankers efterlevnad av Basel II? How do you ensure 
Swedish banks’ compliance with Basel II?
7. Ser ni några nackdelar med Basel II? Have you experienced any negative aspects of 
Basel II?
8. Ser ni några fördelar med Basel II? Have you experienced any positive aspects of 
Basel II?
9. Om ni fick möjlighet, skulle ni förändra något med regelverket och i så fall vad? If you 
had the opportunity, would you change anything about the framework?
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Appendix 3 - Interview Questions to the Central and Regional 
Organisations
1. Skulle ni beskriva er organisation som centraliserad eller decentraliserad? Would you 
describe your organisation as centralised or decentralised?
2. Hur ser arbetsgången ut vid implementering av Basel II? How does your process of 
implementing the Basel II Framework look?
3. Hade er befintliga organisationsstruktur någon inverkan på hur smidigt eller svårt det 
var att implementera Basel II-regelverket och i så fall hur? Has your current 
organisational structure had any effect on the implementation process and in that case 
how?
4. Med hänsyn till er organisationsstruktur vilka för- och nackdelar finns det med Basel 
II? With regard to your organisational structure, are there any positive and negative 
aspects of the framework?
5. Hur upplevde ni implementeringen av Basel II? Var något lättare eller svårare vid 
implementeringen? How did you experience the implementation of Basel II? Was 
anything more or less easy?
6. Tror ni att bankkontor av olika storlek har upplevt implementeringsprocessen olika? 
Fanns det för- och nackdelar för kontor av olika storlek vad gällde 
implementeringsprocessen? Do you think offices of different size have experience the 
implementation process differently? Concerning the implementation process, were 
there any advantages or disadvantages for offices of different size?
7. Har ni upplevt några nackdelar med Basel II? Have you experienced any negative 
aspects of Basel II?
8. Har ni upplevt några fördelar med Basel II? Have you experienced any positive 
aspects of Basel II?
9. Tror ni att Basel II tillämpas enhetligt av alla era kontor? Do you think that Basel II is 
applied uniformly by all your offices?
10. Tror ni att regelverket tillämpas enhetligt av andra banker? Do you think that Basel II 
is applied uniformly by other banks?
11. Hur säkerställer ni efterlevnaden av Basel II inom organisationen? How do you ensure 
compliance with Basel II within the organisation?
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12. Hur säkerställer ni att de som arbetar med Basel II har tillräcklig förståelse för 
regelverket? How do you ensure that your employees have enough knowledge and 
understanding of Basel II?
13. Om ni fick möjlighet, skulle ni förändra något med regelverket och i så fall vad? If you 
had the opportunity, would you change anything about the framework?
14. Mot bakgrund av finanskrisen, vad är er generella åsikt om Basel II? With regard to 
the current financial crisis, what is your general opinion of Basel II?
15. Mot bakgrund av finanskrisen, tror ni att det i framtiden kommer att ske några 
förändringar inom Basel II? With regard to the financial crisis, do you think that there 
will be any changes made to the framework in the future?
98
Appendix 4 - Interview Questions to Local Offices
1. Skulle ni beskriva er organisation som centraliserad eller decentraliserad? Would you 
describe your organisation as centralised or decentralised?
2. Hur ser arbetsgången ut vid implementering av Basel II i ert kontor? How does your 
process of implementing the Basel II Framework look?
3. Hade er banks organisationsstruktur någon inverkan på hur smidigt eller svårt det var 
att implementera Basel II-regelverket och i så fall hur? Has your current 
organisational structure had any effect on the implementation process and in that case 
how?
4. Med hänsyn till er organisationsstruktur upplever ni några för- och nackdelar med 
Basel II? With regard to your organisational structure, have you experienced any 
positive and negative aspects of the framework?
5. Hur upplevde ni implementeringen av Basel II i ert kontor? Var något lättare eller 
svårare vid implementeringen? How did you experience the implementation of Basel II 
in your office? Was anything more or less easy?
6. Tror ni att bankkontor av olika storlek har upplevt implementeringsprocessen olika? 
Tror ni att det fanns för- och nackdelar för kontor av olika storlek vad gällde 
implementeringsprocessen? Do you think offices of different size have experience the 
implementation process differently? Concerning the implementation process, were 
there any advantages or disadvantages for offices of different size?
7. Har ni upplevt några nackdelar med Basel II hos ert kontor? Have you experienced 
any negative aspects of Basel II in your office?
8. Har ni upplevt några fördelar med Basel II hos ert kontor? Have you experienced any 
positive aspects of Basel II in your office?
9. Tror ni att Basel II tillämpas enhetligt av andra kontor inom organisationen? Do you 
think that Basel II is applied uniformly by all offices within the organisation?
10. Hur säkerställs efterlevnaden av Basel II inom er organisation? How do you ensure 
compliance with Basel II within the organisation?
11. Hur säkerställs efterlevnaden av Basel II på ert kontor? How do you ensure 
compliance with Basel II within the office?
12. Hur säkerställs kunskapen om Basel II på ert kontor? How do you ensure that 
employees within the office have enough knowledge and understanding of Basel II?
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13. Om ni fick möjlighet, skulle ni förändra något med regelverket och i så fall vad? If you 
had the opportunity, would you change anything about the framework?
